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grammes). A key goal of the conference was to provide an opportunity for 
participants to share their knowledge and experience. The impact of weak 
defence institutions in the face of fiscal challenges is a risk all NATO mem-
ber and partner countries take seriously, and is a well-known obstacle for 
stabilization and reconstruction in conflict zones. The conference provided a 
forum for participants to discuss how to improve the current BI Tool Kit and 
build stronger institutions that promote the best use of defence resources. 
The evening reception hosted by NATO the first day allowed participants 
to meet and discuss collective security challenges. The second day’s 
plenary sessions opened with a keynote by Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation, General Jean-Paul Paloméros. Next, a diverse group of 
distinguished speakers offered evidence of the risk corruption poses to 
individual and collective security efforts. The next day, four working group 
syndicates were tasked with identifying innovative approaches to address 
those risks. Every conference participant was asked to sign up for one of 
the working groups. Reports from the intense deliberations of the work-
ing group syndicates were shared with all participants the last day. The 
final session included closing remarks and a discussion of next steps. 
Key issues highlighted in plenary sessions and syndicate working  
groups included:
Welcome to the Proceedings of the third biennial NATO Building Integrity 
(BI) Conference. The conference took place 25–28 February 2013 and 
attracted nearly 200 civilian and military officials from over 39 nations 
including academicians, practitioners, and subject matter experts, as well 
as representatives from nearly a dozen international organisations. This 
distinguished group met in Monterey, California, home of NATO’s North 
American Partnership Training and Education Center—the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS). The biennial conference is part of NATO’s Building 
Integrity (BI) Programme launched in 2007, endorsed by NATO Heads of 
State at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, and again at the NATO Summit held 
in Chicago in 2012. The U.S. supports the BI Programme through a bien-
nial conference organized by the Defense Resources Management Institute 
(DRMI), jointly sponsored by OSD-Policy and NATO. The primary focus of 
the BI Programme is to minimize corruption risks and strengthen indi-
vidual and collective security by encouraging countries to build integrity, 
increase transparency, and improve accountability in the defence sector. 
Following Lisbon and Chicago, the BI Programme gave priority to develop-
ing tailored support for Afghanistan and South Eastern Europe. The confer-
ence was intended to shape these efforts, and to improve and expand the BI 
Tool Kit. The Tool Kit is available to all member and partner countries and 
consists of three main pillars: a diagnostic tool (survey questionnaire); a set 
of prescriptions (a “Compendium of Best Practices” translated into multiple 
languages); and an implementing strategy (BI Education & Training pro-
Welcome Comments 
by Dr. Francois Melese
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1. The strategic impact of corruption on stabilization, reconstruction
and governance efforts.
2. Lessons learned from other sectors, international organisations, and 
civil society.
3. Improvements to planning and implementation of operations and 
civil-military cooperation to support good governance.
4. Guidance for countries on choosing a mix of investments to build 
integrity, increase transparency, and improve accountability.
5. A review of the BI Tool Kit to help nations improve institutions and 
build force structures that offer value for money.
The wide-ranging discussions highlighted the fact that countries are 
rapidly joining the BI community as the burden of corruption is increas-
ingly recognized as a significant political, economic, and national security 
liability. NATO members and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries 
increasingly recognize the threat on NATO’s ability to plan and conduct 
successful operations/missions. Some of the lessons learned include:
1. Need to better align civilian and military cooperation in 
anti-corruption efforts.
2. Need for an overarching framework to coordinate
and strengthen common efforts.
3. Need for expert advice and technical assistance to
develop Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other
developing security forces’ institutional capacity.
4. Need to further enhance BI Tool Kit to build
capacity and promote good practice.
General recommendations for next steps identified by the NATO  
International Staff include:
1. Translating values of integrity, transparency, and accountability 
into actions on the ground
Development of a framework document to complement North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) approved BI Education and Training Plan 
highlighting the strategic impact of corruption on stabilization, 
reconstruction, and governance, and how planning and implementa-
tion of NATO-led operations can strengthen integrity, transparency, 
and accountability in the defence and security sector.
2. Strengthening civil-military cooperation
Establishment of a civil-military taskforce including representatives 
of the Strategic Commands to address BI issues during all phases of a 
conflict.
3. Improving capacity-building tools
Recommend implementing the BI Education and Training Plan and 
review of the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review Process, including 
strengthening measures of performance and taking stock of lessons 
learned from past assessments. Update the BI Compendium develop-
ing a second volume of best practices.
We hope you gain valuable insights from reading through these proceed-
ings. On behalf of the organizers at the Defense Resources Manage-
ment Institute (DRMI), I would like to express our gratitude to all 
participants, speakers, rapporteurs, moderators, and conference staff, 
and especially to OSD-Policy and NATO as sponsors of this flagship 
event. We look forward to continuing this valuable collaboration with 




Professor of Economics & Executive Director
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Opening Remarks and Keynote Address 
Participants
Rear Admiral Jan Tighe
Interim President, Naval Postgraduate School 
H.E. Ambassador Dirk Brengelmann 
Assistant Secretary General, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, 
NATO HQ
General Jean-Paul Paloméros (FRAAF)
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
Rear Admiral Jan Tighe and Ambassador Dirk Brengelmann opened the con-
ference and welcomed participants. Admiral Tighe’s and Ambassador Brengel-
mann’s comments are available at http://bi2013.org/conference-presentations.
Summary Reported by Walter Christman, Ph.D.
General Jean-Paul Paloméros gave the keynote address focused on the 
strategic impact of corruption in crisis, conflict, and stabilization efforts. 
In this address, he noted that while NATO has been fortunate to rely 
on military forces, which uphold the highest standards of integrity and 
honesty, its members have to accept that different nations might have a 
slightly different interpretation of the word “integrity,” and different toler-
ance of certain corrupt behaviors. Lessons learned from NATO operations 
in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and many other places have shown examples 
of corruption that had the potential to undermine the Alliance’s abil-
ity to conduct effective operations, and possibly even to prevent NATO 
from winning the battle for the “hearts and minds” of the population.
In response, the NATO Building Integrity Programme was launched 
in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 2007 to raise aware-
ness, promote good practice, and reduce the risk of corruption. The 
Programme is part of NATO’s commitment to strengthening good 
governance, and it potentially encompasses all of the Alliance’s core 
tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. 
General Paloméros indicated that there are a couple of guiding prin-
ciples that a military should embrace, before it proactively engages on 
this subject. Firstly, there must be understanding of the environment 
within which NATO forces are operating. Secondly, analysis of the 
risk of corruption is to be embedded in a global planning perspec-
tive, and finally mitigation measures must be clearly identified.  
More than ever, and thanks to increased access to information, 
populations are sensitive to the integrity of their leaders (or lack 
thereof). In fact, it appears that corruption is today the primary 
cause of populations’ dissatisfaction. This reinforces the permanent 
need to diffuse any suspicion that NATO forces could be involved 
in such practices, or even that they are perceived to be so.
Plenary Sessions
Tuesday 26 February
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General Paloméros argued that for NATO’s efforts to be effective, they must 
not be treated in isolation from wider anti-corruption efforts. They must be 
led in a comprehensive approach through an effective coordination and part-
nership among all involved stakeholders. And since the boundaries between 
organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are more and more blurred, 
a stakeholder could be an actor, private or public, international or national, 
state, non-state, or even an individual with whom the Alliance needs to 
cooperate in order to deliver mutual benefits based on risk and gain.
In order to turn this conceptual approach into reality, General Palo-
méros observed that the Education and Training plan is at the very 
heart of the Allied Command Transformation’s (ACT’s) core mission. 
His Command is responsible, since the end of last year, for deliver-
ing all of NATO’s collective education, training, and exercises.  
ACT’s aim is first to integrate, within training and exercises, scenarios 
that reflect much of the lessons learned from operations. This will enable 
those trained to detect, identify, and correct activities that are counter to 
the principles of integrity. In addition, with the help of numerous national 
efforts, ACT has been able to help coordinate more than 30 courses that will 
be made available to NATO attendees in 2013. These courses should help 
in particular to instill the necessary mind-set and to disseminate the best 
practices in the areas of transparency and accountability. The golden thread 
is teaching, educating the military not to create situations that can poten-
tially trigger corruption. He cited, for instance, that when NATO employs 
an indigenous workforce in Kosovo or Afghanistan, it should be careful 
not to destabilize the local economy. NATO also needs to develop procure-
ment processes that promote local ownership in using the best practices.
A second goal for ACT is to support the development of institutional 
capabilities and local forces. As a result of a set of complicated and in-
terlinked situations and circumstances peculiar to each operation, all 
local forces’ education and training support must be developed and 
delivered on a case-by-case basis. General Paloméros then turned to the 
subject of Afghanistan, where the goal is to develop institutional and 
individual capabilities in support of the Afghan National Security Forces. 
The Afghan Ministries of Defence and Interior have already completed 
the Building Integrity Self Assessment, and with the help of subject mat-
ter experts, the BI team has developed a tailored programme focused on 
building resource management procedures and individual capabilities.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that in Afghanistan corrup-
tion has a fertile ground in poppy cultivation and narcotics trade, which 
has developed partly because people must satisfy their fundamental 
needs. For many Afghan farmers, the alternative to poppy growing has 
been misery—if not starvation. In such circumstance, they could not be 
expected to obey a law banning poppy cultivation, enforced in such a 
way as to change deeply their way of life and at the end deprive them of 
their livelihood. Even so, not all poppy cultivation, of course, should be 
attributed to poor farmers with no alternatives. Some is attributable to 
greed and motivated by profit—the work of criminal organisations.
In addition, the Taliban has taken political advantage of the resurgence 
in poppy farming to present themselves as the defenders of the farmers 
against a foreign enemy, bent on destroying their livelihoods in order 
to shield their own drug dependent citizens and societies. The Taliban 
also have benefited from the informal—but organized—“taxation” of 
revenues from the traffic in drugs. It is well known as well that 98% 
of poppy production comes from the most insecure provinces.
Plenary Sessions
General Jean-Paul Paloméros (FRAF), Supreme 
Allied Commander Transformation
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Consequently, General Paloméros argued that one cannot imagine any 
anti-corruption, any anti-drug policy without security improvement. 
This underlines the challenge that stands before the Afghans and allies 
together, and why the comprehensive approach is indispensable to tackle 
such a wide, encompassing political, societal, economic, and security 
issue. Security and corruption are intricately linked, and as a golden rule, 
one can say that the absence of security implies systematic corruption. 
NATO and its military and civilian partners must have sufficient local 
knowledge to understand the intentions and capabilities of those local 
actors charged with implementing projects or administering grants.  
As NATO shifts to the post–2014 phase of its Afghanistan mission—and 
prepares for other contingencies—one common feature will be the need for 
a broad and enduring commitment, requiring the integration of civilian and 
military efforts. Building integrity and stabilization need a realistic transi-
tion planning from the outset, along with trained militaries and civilians 
prepared to work, if needed, in a demanding environment. It can only be 
effective if anti-corruption strategies are properly taught and implemented.
General Paloméros concluded his remarks with a powerful thought 
from the 17th century French playwright, Jean Baptiste Poquelin, 
best known as “Moliere,” who wrote in his famous play Tartuffe: 
“If everyone were clothed with integrity, if every heart were just, 
frank, kindly, the other virtues would be well-nigh useless.”   n




Deputy Chief, Corruption and Economic Crime Branch, 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Mr. Francisco Cardona
Senior Adviser, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Ms. Helga Thorolfsdottir
Gender Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iceland
Summary Reported by Anna Miro
This plenary session addressed the issue of the global impact on peace and 
economic development, and was presented by a panel comprised of Ms. Can-
dice Welsch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Mr. Francisco 
Cardona of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
and Ms. Helga Thorolfsdottir of the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Ms. Welsch gave a presentation discussing the role of key public institutions 
in economic development and security, the impact of corruption on these 
institutions, and the work done by the United Nations (UN) to combat cor-
ruption. She began by discussing the role of economic, social, and political 
institutions and the role they play in combatting corruption, noting that ef-
fective institutions legitimize government. Ms. Welsch examined the tangible 
and intangible costs of corruption, with the tangible costs including the de-
pletion of national wealth. She also discussed the economic impact of bribes, 
noting that the total cost of corruption is more than 5% of global GDP each 
year. Intangible costs of corruption include citizens losing faith in their 
governments, leading to lack of participation in government and weakening 
institutions. Ms. Welsch also discussed the impact of corruption in Afghani-
stan, arguing that corruption is becoming increasingly embedded in social 
practices. She noted that 56% of the population considers corruption a key 
concern, 50% of the population paid a bribe when requesting a public ser-
vice in 2012, and that 25% of police bribes result in the release of a criminal. 
Plenary Sessions
Rear Admiral Jan Tighe, Interim President, 
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Ms. Welsch concluded by discussing the UN’s role in countering cor-
ruption, specifically the history and attributes of the UN Convention 
Against Corruption. Ms. Welsch highlighted specific articles that ad-
dress judicial and prosecutorial integrity, anti-corruption authorities, 
police and prisons, and fighting corruption through education. 
Mr. Cardona delivered a presentation on institutional integrity, emphasiz-
ing that corruption destroys public trust in institutions. He noted that 
through his work, it was discovered that the greatest challenge was not 
simply building institutions, but rather building effective institutions trusted 
by citizens. Mr. Cardona noted that integrity allows for confidence in an 
institution, governance system, or a nation. He highlighted four different 
citizen trust generators: credibility of policies; reliability and resilience of 
the institutions implementing policies; predictability and contestability 
of public decisions; and accountability of those holding authority. Mr. 
Cardona noted that past governance reforms weakened public trust and led 
to more corruption, and therefore reforms must be carefully considered. 
Mr. Cardona concluded by making recommendations to help address 
corruption. These recommendations included: strengthening core state 
institutions, particularly regulating institutions (administrative justice, 
ombudsman-type institutions, anti-corruption agencies, and court of 
accounts.) Additionally, he noted several important considerations: factor-
ing ethics and inequality reduction into regulation agendas; strengthening 
the professionalism of the public service; and enhancing parliamentary 
oversight roles. Finally, he included in the list of considerations: improv-
ing internal financial control; integrity management; integrity plans and 
risk assessments; and enhancing the quality of public services delivery. 
Ms. Thorolfsdottir gave the third presentation, focusing on the inclusion of 
women in the defence sector and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
Women, Peace, and Security. She stated that there are notable gaps between 
good intentions and actions relating to equality, which impacts the inclusion 
of women in the security sector. She noted that women are still excluded 
from the peace process, and added that aid to post–conflict societies is 
not geared towards women. She further stated that the active participa-
tion of women in peace means participation in reducing corruption. 
Ms. Thorolfsdottir raised questions for the audience to consider: How 
does corruption in the defence and security sector affect men and women 
differently? Do men and women support and engage in corrupt practices 
in the same way, or not? How do women contribute to building integrity 
and fighting corruption in the defence sector, and how does it differ 
from men? Ms. Thorolfsdottir followed these questions with personal 
observations, noting that she believes corruption to be gendered. Addition-
ally, she believes when women are excluded from being hired, they are 
excluded from institutional decision-making, affecting women’s security. 
She also noted that when a blind eye is turned to security forces com-
mitting violence against women, women’s security is affected. However, 
she does not believe that women are inherently less corrupt than men. 
Ms. Thorolfsdottir noted that education and training are generally recom-
mended to facilitate change, but it is difficult to change when it does not ap-
pear beneficial to us. Additionally, it is difficult to instruct others to change, 
but not change ourselves. She concluded by asking the audience to consider 
whether or not those in the defence sector are really committed to gender 
equality and to consider how we can better transform words into actions. 
Question & Answer
The Chair opened up the floor for questions and comments. The first 
respondent noted that it is paradoxical that many of the presenters 
Plenary Sessions
Keynote Address
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mentioned corruption in Afghanistan, when surveys found that 85% of 
the Afghan population has confidence in security forces. The respondent 
noted that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a highly positive 
economic perspective for Afghanistan, adding that the economy grew 11% 
in 2012, and investment in Afghanistan has increased. The respondent 
asked the audience to ponder how a country with high economic growth 
rates could be as corrupt as some presenters are suggesting. The respondent 
concluded by acknowledging that there is corruption in Afghanistan, but 
the level of corruption is exaggerated by some organisations. A panelist 
responded saying that they were not attempting to downplay the progress 
made in Afghanistan, but they were simply stating the data collected.
A second participant asked the panel about dealing with the media and 
public perception when a government is addressing corruption. The par-
ticipant noted as government addresses corruption, more stories about 
corruption appear in the media. The public interprets these stories as 
increased corruption, rather than the government addressing corruption. 
In response to the presentation about gender, the participant noted that in 
his/her country, a female rose to the position of Administrative Chief of 
Contract Procurement in the National Police. She dramatically decreased the 
perception of corruption, and left her successor with an increased capacity 
for addressing corruption. Two panelists responded, the first suggesting that 
the government focus on public awareness to address the public perception 
of corruption. The second responded, saying that trust in the government 
is key; the more active and effective a government is against corruption, the 
more the public will be aware that the government is addressing corruption.
A third participant raised the question about the loss of trust of international 
organisations, specifically citing the IMF and its intervention in Central 
and Eastern Europe. A panelist responded, noting that international or-
ganisations could better assist not by instructing countries what to do, but 
rather instructing countries on the results they should try and achieve. 
A fourth participant stated that he/she believes women are included in 
the security sector, and corruption should not be gendered. A panel-
ist responded, stating that there is a “ways to go” to achieve gender 
equality, and that it is important to talk about how men and women 
can work together to achieve results in addressing corruption.  n
Why We Need Defence Institutions that Can Be 
Trusted and Offer Value for Money
Participants 
Mr. Jim Schear
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and  
Stability Operations, US Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Mr. Ahmed Yassine Foukara
Head of the Strategy and Studies, 
Central Authority for Corruption Prevention in Morocco
Mr. Peter Watkins
Director General, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 
Summary Reported by LTC Steven Hanson
The Chair opened this session and presented the key point of the  
discussion—that confidence in public institutions is crucial given the 
limited and decreasing resources that will be spent on defence in the future. 
Given this certainty, the fundamental questions to the panel were: What 
is “special” about defence institutions? Why is it that these institutions, 
more so than others, demand integrity of the public? Why is it important 
Plenary Sessions
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to invest in the integrity, transparency, and accountability of our defence 
institutions? How does this contribute to good governance, and how do we 
promote a virtuous cycle that delivers efficient and effective management 
that contributes to stability and economic growth? The panel was comprised 
of Mr. Jim Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership 
Strategy and Stability Operations, U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
Mr. Ahmed Yassine Foukara, Head of the Strategy and Studies, Central 
Authority for Corruption Prevention (ICPC) in Morocco; and Mr. Peter 
Watkins, Director General, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
Mr. Jim Schear discussed security and summarized by saying that security 
is like oxygen—you tend to not notice it until you lose it. When asked by 
an audience member how defence institutions can gain the public’s trust, 
he responded by saying that no one size solution fits all—building integ-
rity is one small step in a larger problem of legitimizing our institutions 
to the populace. He went on to describe Defense Institution Building’s 
(DIB’s) core objectives in supporting partner nations in building effective, 
efficient, and accountable defence institutions. This requires a balance 
between near-term performance in supporting operational require-
ments, long-term capacity building, and the establishment of ministerial 
functions with an end goal of defence resource planning, programming, 
and budgeting. Mr. Schear discussed how DIB challenges are distinctive 
to each partner country as all have unique needs and aspirations and 
explained that patience and public acceptance is required for success. 
The biggest challenges for partners is the ability to generate the political 
will to support change, the ability to discuss it openly, and the ability to 
institutionalize it so that the changes outlive their original champions.  
Mr. Foukara gave the second presentation. He first introduced the ICPC 
which is an independent authority that coordinates, supervises, and evalu-
ates national policies for the prevention and fight against corruption in 
Morocco. It has investigative and audit powers and has been provided with 
sufficient resources, legal protections, and financial autonomy to be able to 
conduct its mandate. In the next portion of his presentation, Mr. Foukara 
focused on corruption in the defence industry and stated that studies have 
shown that corruption has had a dramatic effect on the industry. World 
Bank estimates have shown that the cost of corruption is 5% of world 
GDP, over a trillion dollars. Transparency International has found that 
countries with poor controls to prevent corruption in the defence sector 
include two-thirds of the largest arms importers and half of the biggest 
arms exporters in the world. Mr. Foukara discussed the notion that it is 
more difficult to combat corruption in the defence industry than in other 
sectors due to the uniqueness involved in the defence sector (such as 
secrecy, national security issues, and the perceived need to react quickly), 
and the multitude of different actors who play in defence. As a proposed 
way forward to combat corruption in defence, Mr. Foukara presented 
the ICPC approach which integrates prevention, education and training, 
repression, and information and awareness training. ICPC’s approach 
emphasizes communication; building political will and alliances in sup-
port of reform efforts; and setting reasonable goals and expectations.
The third panel presenter, Mr. Watkins, stated that the provision of security 
is an accepted part of the social contract, but that security institutions can 
exhibit predatory behaviors when they forget that they are part of a larger 
governmental institution; do not provide effective, efficient and well-
managed services; and are not held accountable. Mr. Watkins stated that 
some evidence shows that certain forms of corruption can be stabilizing 
because individuals are tied to the system that enriches and/or empowers 
them. However, most types are not and can be major drivers of instabil-
ity and insurgency. Additionally, the accumulated evidence shows that 
corruption erodes confidence in government and security institutions. 
Further, Mr. Watkins noted that incidents of corruption are invariably 
linked to the political economy in which they take place. In other words, 
corruption “thrives” where there are incentives to do so, and the political 
infrastructure is not mature enough/advanced enough to deal with it. In 
conclusion, Mr. Watkins urged NATO and its member states to recognize 
the importance, complexity, and situation-specific nature of corruption, and 
to plan prevention strategies using the Building Integrity Initiative that are 
active not only within individual governments and but also across NATO.
Question & Answer
An audience member pressed the panel on what can be done to com-
bat corruption because, “We can’t afford NOT to! Due to the financial 
crises, countries cannot even afford the small dollar amounts that 
Plenary Sessions
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we have now in building integrity.” Panelists responded that this was 
the wrong way to think about or approach the problem given the 
amount that corruption costs. The return on investment in building 
integrity efforts can be very large and seen in many areas. The panel-
ists presented the following as specific efforts to combat corruption:
1. Strengthen human resources systems and financial systems that can 
detect and identify corruption through behavior.  
2. Determine how the various activities to combat
corruption complement each other.
3. Provide straightforward, practical guidance that our commanders can 
turn to in order to make these events (from point 2) a reality. This 
does not need to be a 50-page document, but something short and 
user-friendly.
Mr. Watkins mentioned that certain activates are more prone to corruption 
than others—he specifically mentioned Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program (CERP) as a programme that was designed for quick use, to quickly 
help the local populace. He noted that the flip side of these programmes, 
by definition, is that they are more prone to corruption. This is the price we 
have to pay sometimes, to make things happen quickly. Another panel mem-
ber also mentioned the costs of compliance in terms of combating corrup-
tion. These mitigating programmes are not free; they are, in fact, very expen-
sive. We must take these costs into account. The view in some circles is that, 
after 2014, when we leave Afghanistan, we will not be involved in large oper-
ations like this, and therefore corruption might be less of an issue; however, 
other panel members commented that they believe this is faulty thinking.
A participant noted that in there is no uniformity in building integrity 
approaches or techniques—there are situations in which the British 
do one thing, the Americans do another thing, and the Germans do a 
third. The participant felt that there was a need to have a coordinated 
system for transparency. The panel agreed with this sentiment, but talked 
about the challenges in finding a system on which everyone agrees.
Finally, a participant queried, “Has corruption reached levels where a bubble 
might “burst” if nothing is done right now? Corruption is like a cancer—you 
can ignore it, but once you start seeing symptoms on your body, it is too 
late.” Panel members responded saying they have noticed some “hesitating 
in political will” in some governments, and our challenge is to convince 
policy makers that it is no longer an option to hesitate about corruption.  n
Building Integrity, Transparency, and  




US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz (FRAAR)
Vice Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 
Mr. Orisi Rabukawaqa
Policy and Liaison Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
United Nations Secretariat
Summary Reported by Samantha Schwellenbach 
This plenary session addressed the challenges of building integrity, transpar-
ency, and accountability in the defence and security sector in the reconstruc-
tion and stabilization environment. The panel was comprised of Mr. John 
Sopko, U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; 
Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, Vice Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Powers Europe; and Mr. Orisi Rabukawaqa, Policy and Liaison 
Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Secretariat.
Mr. John Sopko delivered a briefing highlighting the role of the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and its efforts 
to ensure the unprecedented investment in Afghanistan is protected from 
fraud, waste, and abuse. All reports are published directly to its website at 
http://www.sigar.mil/ and disseminated to media outlets. He believes that 
the media plays a vital role in the increased awareness of corruption. Mr. 
Sopko feels that media raises public awareness of the issues and often is a 
contributing factor in forcing future action to be taken. The SIGAR quarterly 
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reports are one of the largest data calls that a United States organisation 
prepares on Afghanistan. The most recent quarterly report, from January 
2013, identifies a series of questions that decision makers should address 
before considering an implementation of a project or programme. These are:
1. Does the project or programme clearly contribute to U.S. national 
interests or strategic objectives?
2. Do the Afghans want it and need it?
3. Has the project or programme been coordinated with the Afghan 
government, other implementing agencies, and international donors?
4. Do security conditions permit effective implementation 
and oversight?
5. Does the project or programme include safeguards to detect, deter, 
and mitigate corruption?
6. Do the Afghans have the financial resources, technical capacity, and 
political will to sustain the project or programme?
7. Have implementation agencies established real metrics for 
determining outcomes and measuring success?
Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Philippe Stoltz delivered a briefing describ-
ing how corruption reduces public trust, lessens operational effectiveness, 
wastes scarce resources, prevents companies from carrying out business, 
and prevents military forces from accomplishing the mission. One of the 
significant challenges being recognized is that corruption is often viewed 
as a side issue rather than crucial to mission success. He highlighted five 
(5) factors that outline a framework essential to building integrity. 
These factors are: 
1. Engage with national institutions to administer finance.
2. Provide expertise through ongoing programmes and training.
3. Provide military knowledge and advice.
4. Help civilian institutions develop oversight bodies.
5. Improve military justice systems.
Lt Gen Stoltz emphasized that strengthening of host nation institutions 
must be developed in cooperation with the country. As human resource 
management is particularly sensitive to corruption, leadership must be 
exemplary and provide honest objective assessment. Conduct in opera-
tions is essential, and stakeholders must be credible in theater and lead by 
example. Corruption, or even perceived corruption, will have a negative 
impact on the mission. Moving forward, anti-corruption policy needs to 
be developed and enforced, and increased training programmes should 
be implemented to raise awareness of corruption risks. Lt Gen Stoltz 
concluded by noting that NATO credibility is paramount in building 
integrity, and there needs to be a zero tolerance approach to corruption. 
Mr. Orisi Rabukawaqa delivered a briefing highlighting the importance of 
an integrated approach to defence and security sector reform. The desire 
for reform needs to be identified by the nation, and there must be “buy in” 
from political leadership. In practice there will most likely be international 
stakeholders with the United Nations (UN) playing a support role. Types of 
potential UN support include reforms related to infrastructure, functionality, 
assets, legislation/policy, and combined reforms. Mr. Rabukawaqa concluded 
by noting that there are three (3) essential dimensions—political, holistic, 
and technical—in security sector reform, and each of these must be ad-
dressed to provide an efficient, effective, accountable, and affordable solution. 
Question & Answer
After completion of the panel discussions the Chair opened the floor 
for questions and comments. The first comment emphasized that build-
ing integrity efforts must be integrated into early plans rather than as an 
afterthought. A panelist agreed that within defence security sector reform 
there is additional scope for harmonization and interagency coordination. 
A second participant raised the question on the effect of the drawdown 
on the Inspector General’s (IG) mission in Afghanistan. The panelist 
advised the drawdown is already having an effect on its operations. The 
IG operates under Chief of Mission rules. Thus security is provided by 
U.S. military. As the drawdown occurs a decreasing number of military 
personnel are available to provide these escorts. Another significant impact 
seen is that audit teams are unable to visit as many locations due to base 
closures. The Golden Hour rule means U.S. military personnel are not 
able to travel beyond one hour’s “reach” to a military medical facility, thus 
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limiting the reach of the visiting teams and their escorts. In special cases 
exemptions may be approved; however, after Benghazi, the number of 
exemptions will be greatly reduced due to the increase in perceived risk.
A third participant raised the question of the best body to coor-
dinate security sector reform, and what might be the roles of the 
UN and NATO. A panelist admitted that there is often abysmal 
interagency coordination and advised that efficient interagency co-
ordination would require mutually agreed upon milestones.  
A fourth participant noted that in pouring capacity into a country, you 
may slow the growth of a government because leaders are no longer able 
to manage matters themselves. The question was asked: Is there a tradeoff 
in building capacity immediately with limiting the institutional capability? 
In response a panelist responded that host nation governments and allies 
need to learn from past experiences and improve upon them for the future.  
In conclusion, the Chair noted that whilst there are many challenges 
of building integrity, transparency, and accountability in the defence 
and security sector, especially in the reconstruction and stabilization 
environment, the importance has never been higher. These efforts to 
help nations enhance integrity, reduce risks of corruption, and en-
able partner nations’ efforts to promote good governance.  n
Meeting Commitments Made at Chicago Summit 
and Tokyo Conference to Strengthen Transparency, 
Accountability, and Integrity in Afghanistan
Participants
H.E. Ambassador Homayoun Tandar
Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to NATO 
Brigadier General Flemming Agerskov (DAAR)
Commander Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat, ISAF HQ 
Mr. Joris Ghesquière
Head Plans and Policy Branch, NATO Office of Resources, NATO HQ
Summary Reported by Jonathan Lipow, Ph.D.
This plenary session focused on progress in the implementation of interna-
tional commitments made at the Chicago Summit and the Tokyo Conference 
to strengthen transparency, accountability, and integrity in Afghanistan. Pan-
el members included H.E. Homayoun Tandar, the ambassador of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan to NATO; Brigadier General (BG) Flemming Ag-
erskov, Commander of the Joint Interagency Task Force (CJITC) Shafafiyat–
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) HQ; and Mr. Joris Ghesqui-
ere, Head of Plans and Policy Brach, NATO Office of Resources, NATO HQ.
Ambassador Tandar gave a presentation that focused on progress in 
meeting the commitments Afghanistan and the international com-
munity made at the Chicago Summit and Tokyo Conference. First, he 
reviewed the nature of the commitments made by the international 
community and the Afghan government. He emphasized that, first and 
foremost, the international community had made a binding long-term 
commitment to be engaged in Afghanistan and support its government. 
In addition, he reminded the audience that the international com-
munity pledged $16 billion in financial support for Afghanistan during 
2012–2015, and made it clear that while Afghanistan’s leaders recognize 
the difficult economic conditions facing its allies, these resources remain 
absolutely vital to the success of the allied effort in Afghanistan.
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Turning to Afghan commitments, Ambassador Tandar recounted that 
his government had agreed to meet requirements laid out in the Tokyo 
Accountability Framework, and said that Afghanistan takes this com-
mitment very seriously. The ambassador outlined five areas where 
Afghanistan was striving, in cooperation and with the assistance of 
the international community, to meet its Tokyo Commitments:
1. Democratic elections,
2. Rule of law,
3. Human rights,
4. Government budget execution, and
5. Inclusive, sustained economic growth and social development.
He concluded this portion of his remarks by discussing arrange-
ments for monitoring the progress of Afghanistan and the interna-
tional community in meeting commitments, and explained that progress 
would be reviewed next by a standing committee to be convened in 
2015, to be chaired by Afghanistan and the United Kingdom. 
The Ambassador next reported on the progress made in developing 
Afghanistan’s armed forces and internal security forces. He began by 
reminding the audience that there had been an argument in Chicago 
regarding the proper size of the Afghan military, with the international 
community generally supporting a reduction in size, but that the conclu-
sion had been that the current size of the force would be retained until 
at least 2017. He reported that the cost of the force was in the range of 
$4 billion per year, with Afghanistan paying only $500 million of that, 
and that Afghanistan was steadily increasing its share of funding.
The Ambassador then outlined various initiatives to enhance the ef-
fectiveness of Afghanistan’s armed forces and police. The first was the 
decentralization of responsibility for budgeting, human rights monitoring, 
and manpower allocation from the national headquarters to the provincial 
and even divisional level. The second was to integrate “Building Integrity” 
topics into all courses and training conducted by the Ministries of Defence 
(MoD) and Interior (MoI). The third was to create “Building Integrity” 
working groups at MoD and MoI that work in coordination with ISAF, and 
to create similar working groups at the provincial level for the army and the 
police. Looking forward, the Ambassador recounted that all contracting will 
soon be transitioned from ISAF to the MoD, and that this is a big challenge 
since MoD has no procedures or standards for how to deal with contracts.
The Ambassador concluded his remarks by addressing Afghanistan’s 
reputation for corruption. He pointed out that recent studies had stated 
that Afghanistan was the most corrupt country on earth, but argued 
that this is not true. To illustrate this, he recounted that the United Na-
tions (UN) Office on Crime and Drugs had estimated that the value 
of bribes in Afghanistan came to $3.1 billion per year. He explained 
that such sums do not exist in Afghanistan, that injection of such sums 
into the economy would fuel rampant inflation that we do not see, and 
that the entire Afghan banking system holds $5 billion in deposits.
Following the Ambassador, BG Agerskov reported on ISAF efforts to 
combat corruption on the ground. The general explained that the task 
force had four separate efforts. The first is Task Force 110, which focuses 
exclusively on contracting. The second is an effort led by the State Depart-
ment that seeks to identify and cut off Taliban funding sources. The third 
is a joint military intelligence and Drug Enforcement Agency effort to 
combat heroin production and smuggling. This effort seeks to “roll up” one 
smuggling network each calendar quarter. Finally, the fourth is a high-level 
counter corruption group that worked in cooperation with the Afghan 
MoD and MoI to develop “Building Integrity” initiatives and strategies.
BG Agerskov began to outline these various initiatives, and prefaced his 
discussion by admitting that he had failed to coordinate his efforts with 
those of regional and local commands, both Afghan and Allied. He also 
said that recent progress has been made in working with the UN, and 
that “we would do the best as we can for the remaining 22 months.”
In terms of CJITC efforts, he explained that his unit conducts field audits 
in conjunction with the Inspectors General of MoD and MoI, where 
units have to explain what they are doing and account for the funds 
spent. The CJITC is also establishing working groups that combine se-
curity forces, media, civil society, religious leaders, and women’s groups 
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at each level, from the local to the central level in Kabul. These groups 
identified complaints and forwarded hundreds of cases to prosecutors. 
The general also emphasized that his team was making an aggressive 
effort to promote media coverage and suggested that a free media was 
an important means of enhancing accountability and transparency.
Turning to budgeting, BG Agerskov explained that he is work-
ing to develop budget arrangements that will work long after ISAF 
departs, something he characterized as the “Afghan Solution.” To 
illustrate the great progress being made, he recounted that under 
the Taliban, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) consisted of tin cans of 
cash under Mullah Omar’s bed, and that the MoF now had reached 
the same level of accountability and transparency as Poland.
That said, the general emphasized that there was still a lot of corruption 
and that more funds were flowing into Afghanistan than could be ef-
fectively managed and monitored. He specifically mentioned the scandals 
at Kabul Bank and the National Military Hospital, and concluded his 
remarks by stating that it was still hard to convict high-level criminals, 
of which he felt the most notorious was President Karzai’s brother.
Mr. Joris Ghesquiere, Head of Plans and Policy Brach at the 
NATO Office of Resources, then delivered remarks focused on in-
ternational sustainability efforts for Afghan forces. He began by 
explaining that, at this time, NATO uses trust funds as the main 
conduit for resources being channeled to Afghan forces.  
Addressing the main topic, Mr. Ghesquiere reminded the audience 
that the Chicago Summit had indeed resulted in a long-term inter-
national commitment to support Afghanistan, and that it also had 
resulted in a commitment by Afghanistan to create accountable defence 
forces that the Afghan government would fund through its own finan-
cial resources. He emphasized that NATO was not directly involved 
in those commitments, but only worked as a facilitator to help donors 
identify what was being done with their money and why, while Af-
ghanistan built up its capacity for accountability and transparency.
He then argued that progress in the field had been grossly inadequate 
relative to international goals. There were multiple funding streams 
that were not coordinated. Afghans were, in practice, excluded from 
efforts to develop institutions for planning, budgeting, and account-
ability. Foreign funds were kept “off budget” and handled by indi-
vidual donors from the international community. Human resources 
management was not connected in any way to payroll management. In 
short, he argued that there had been no long-term vision guiding ac-
countability efforts, and that short-term thinking had prevailed.  
He concluded that Afghans must lead their own institution building 
process. For example, Task Force Alpha handles all budget planning for 
the MoD and will continue to do so until 2014, at which point there is 
no clarity regarding what will happen. He also pointed out that the MoF 
is far ahead of MoD and MoI in developing structures for planning, 
budgeting, and management, and that its success had to be replicated.
Mr. Ghesquiere concluded his remarks with three conclusions. The first 
was that there was widespread awareness in Afghanistan that accountability 
is a problem, and that this was an important success. The second was that 
training and education in Building Integrity were key to future progress, but 
that no progress could be made without encouragement from senior Afghan 
leaders. Finally, he argued that decentralization was important, and that too 
much work was done in Kabul. Decentralization of decision-making would 
lower the headquarters workload, and more closely align incentives between 
those who make decisions and those who have to live with the consequences.
Question & Answer
At this point, the Chair opened up the floor for questions and comments. 
One speaker asked how corruption cases would be dealt with following 2014. 
A second argued that the dual roles of ISAF in war fighting and nation build-
ing led to challenges in prioritization, and asked how these could be handled. 
A third questioned whether decentralization would really reduce corruption. 
BG Agerskov and Mr. Ghesquiere responded by saying that, first and 
foremost, every effort needed to be made in the time that remains to build 
the competence of MoF, MoD, and MoI. They also explained that human 
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resources decisions needed to be decentralized because positions were being 
sold at the central level, and that the belief was that the consequences at the 
local level of using the wrong people would result in greater accountability.
Addressing ISAF’s dual role, Mr. Ghesquiere agreed that there was 
often a tradeoff between good nation building practices and es-
sential war fighting decisions, and he pointed out that often 
contracts are made without any information regarding what rea-
sonable cost constitutes in Afghanistan. However, he emphasized 
that in any conflict among priorities, war fighting came first.
Finally, addressing corruption, BG Agerskov recounted that opium 
generated $2 billion in revenue in Afghanistan per year, but that there 
was $4 billion in annual corruption, and $8 billion of capital is leav-
ing Afghanistan every year. He emphasized that corruption CAUSED 
smuggling and aided the Taliban, not vice versa. As an example, he 
explained that only 1% of trucks are checked at the Afghan border with 
Pakistan. That 1% refused to pay to avoid inspection. Looking at this a 
few months previously, he had found that five different agencies handled 
border security, and that proper toll collection would generate $2–$3 
billion in revenue. He then concluded his remarks by arguing that much 
of the corruption in Afghanistan emanated from the Attorney General’s 
Office, which was refusing to prosecute high-level offenders.  n
Managing Finances in the Defence Sector
Participants
Vice Admiral Landay (USN)
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, US Department of Defense
Brigadier General Adnan Al-Shoumali
Head of International Cooperation Department Directorate of Strategic Planning, 
Jordan Armed Forces
Summary Reported by Jonathan Lipow, Ph.D.
This plenary session focused on international practices for the build-
ing of integrity in the defence sector. Panel members included 
Vice Admiral (VADM) Bill Landay of the Defense Security Coop-
eration Agency and Brigadier General (BG) Adnan Al-Shoumali, 
head of the international cooperation department at the Director-
ate of Strategic Planning of the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces. 
VADM Landay began his presentation by asking what government processes 
actually build integrity, and what arrangements are exploited by the U.S. 
military to do so. He identified a number of key aspects of the U.S. ap-
proach. The first was an emphasis on training and acculturation of military 
personnel to develop their personal sense of integrity and their moral 
judgment. The second was the development of processes and mechanisms 
that would naturally align incentives. The third was the development of a 
robust legal infrastructure that could independently identify and prosecute 
instances of wrongdoing. Finally, the fourth —and most important—was 
the integration of external entities into security sector processes. 
As an example, VADM Landay described the U.S. Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS). The group conducting FMS is an entity responsible to OSD-Policy, 
and as such, it is tasked with the advancement of U.S. strategic goals. It is not 
tasked with drumming up arms sales at all costs. One of the central objec-
tives of the FMS mission is the development of transparent and accountable 
institutions in allied countries. All FMS sales have to be done to U.S. stan-
dards of conduct, something that introduces and promotes higher standards 
of integrity. Furthermore, he emphasized that given the large size of the 
defence sectors, that development of greater integrity in the security sector 
would spill over and enhance anti-corruption efforts throughout the society.
In describing FMS’s standards and strategies for build-
ing integrity, VADM Landay emphasized: 
1. The role of civilian control and oversight, 
2. Anti-corruption and human rights standards,
3. Open competition and transparency in contracting and purchasing,
4. The use of internal and external audits, and 
5. The requirement that only trained and certified personnel be 
involved in FMS. 
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He also cited legislative oversight and media coverage as external fac-
tors that contributed greatly to the process of building integrity.
VADM Landay concluded his remarks by pointing out that there 
are 13,000 FMS cases each year, and that each and every case is re-
garded as an opportunity to reinforce concepts of integrity.
BG Al-Shoumali began his talk by arguing that as transactions had 
become more complicated and technologically intensive, the im-
portance of integrity in their execution had only increased. This 
trend could be expected to continue indefinitely into the future. 
BG Al-Shoumali pointed out that forces were not immune to corrupt 
practices and then described Jordan’s efforts to combat corruption in its 
defence and security institutions. First, he explained that education and 
training in ethics had been integrated into all courses in the Jordanian 
armed forces, and that exposure to the concept of ethics was introduced 
as early as basic training. Second, he mentioned the creation of an 
anti-corruption committee that investigated and prosecuted corrup-
tion cases. Third, he explained that each branch of the Royal Jordanian 
Armed Forces had a completely separate budget as a means of increasing 
transparency and accountability. Fourth, he explained that the Ministry 
of Finance regularly monitored expenditures to make sure that funds 
were being spent on the purposes for which they had been allocated.  
Question & Answer
At this point, the floor was opened for questions. One participant 
asked whether a “total package approach” (effectively, an analysis that 
took into account life cycle costs) was being used for institutional ar-
rangements. In response, VADM Landay explained that it was used, 
and it was necessary to use the total package approach since one of 
the objectives of U.S. FMS was to build long-term relationships.  
Another participant asked whether, given that human resources 
accounts for a far greater portion of defence budgets than pro-
curement, insufficient resources had been allocated to dealing 
with corruption in that sector. Addressing this question, BG Al-
Shoumali explained that Jordan had a five-year plan for its human 
resources and was using this plan to help combat corruption.  n 




Deputy Minister of Defence of the Republic of Georgia
Mr. Miroslav Jovanovic
Assistant Minister for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia
Mr. Svein Eriksen
Senior Advisor, Agency for Public Management and eGovernment, Norway
Summary Reported by Cameron MacKenzie, Ph.D.
This plenary session addressed the relationship between human resources 
and building integrity in the defence and security sectors. Three individuals 
presented talks: Ms. Tamar Karosanidze, Deputy Minister of Defence of the 
Republic of Georgia; Mr. Miroslav Jovanovic, Assistant Minister for Defence 
Policy, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia; and Mr. Svein Eriksen, 
Senior Advisor, Agency for Public Management and Government, Norway.
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Ms. Karosanidze argued that corruption is not an integral part of a 
people’s culture. The sentiment that corruption was a part of the cul-
ture used to be used as an excuse in Georgia since corrupt practices 
were so common. However, the new government that came into power 
in 2002 tackled corruption in patrol police and university admission, 
and these two sectors were fixed. Recent surveys reveal that 90% of 
the Georgian populace feels that those two sectors are now clean.
Ms. Karosanidze believes that there is a need to show to your people 
that you can achieve results and tackle difficult problems. The Geor-
gian defence sector was not very transparent, but human resources 
are now one of the top priorities of the Georgian Ministry of Defence 
(MoD). The MoD is trying to design rules about how manpower 
(both civilian and military) should be developed within the MoD. 
The MoD is engaging employees in the process while developing 
these rules, and the next step is to apply these rules consistently.
For recruitment, the Georgian MoD is beginning to publicize vacancy 
announcements. It is also coordinating with education ministry on 
necessary skills from bachelors and masters candidates. For evalua-
tion and training, the MoD is using evaluations to determine the types 
of training people need. As people come back from training courses or 
exercises, they will conduct mini-trainings of their colleagues. For pro-
motion, salaries of officials are increasing, and working conditions are 
improving. Money is not always the best incentive, but people need to 
understand that they are being fairly evaluated. For release, the budget 
does not have enough money to provide pensions for the Georgian mili-
tary. The MoD is still working on how to develop policies for retirees.
The Georgian MoD is working hard on making the ministry transpar-
ent, and civil society organisations are helping asserted Ms. Karosanidze. 
Media and international attention on the MoD is making them work 
harder. Georgia has decided to join the Building Integrity (BI) Initiative 
and will take part in the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review Process.
Mr. Jovanovic described the two entities responsible for human 
resources in the defence sector in Serbia: one resides within the 
MoD, and one resides within the General Staff. The legal basis for 
managing human resources in the Serbian MoD derives from laws 
for defence and the Serbian Armed Forces. The process for hu-
man resource management in the Serbian MoD includes:
1. Forming a list of candidates,
2. Selecting of candidates for education and training, and
3. Promoting to higher rank.
Mr. Jovanovic explained that the MoD is also introducing codes of conduct. 
The rules and regulations against corruption are being implemented; eight 
people from the Serbian MoD were recently arrested for corruption.
The Serbian MoD joined the NATO BI Initiative in December 2011. It 
performed a Self Assessment in 2012 with help from NATO and Trans-
parency International. The report is posted on the MoD website. 
Concluding his presentation, Mr. Jovanovic stated that the Serbian MoD 
is working at different levels to build integrity. At the national level, it is 
continuing activities in building integrity and fighting corruption. It is 
continuing to work on the BI Initiative with NATO. The MoD is establishing 
connections with international organisations. At a bilateral level, the MoD 
would like to work with neighbors in sharing experience and knowledge.
Mr. Eriksen focused his presentation on the interconnectedness of dif-
ferent organisations in building integrity. As a general principle for 
building integrity, Ministries of Defence should be seen as an integral 
part of the general public administration and not as a separate entity that 
can be carved out from the rest of government. Focusing exclusively on 
the MoD is not sufficient, and it is necessary to consider administrative 
arrangements that cut across the MoD and other ministries. Within a 
NATO context (especially when considering NATO enlargement), the 
challenges facing a MoD are often located outside of the MoD itself. Ar-
rangements and rules for budgeting, human resources, and financial 
management apply across the entire government, not just within the MoD. 
Creating islands of excellence (like a transparent MoD) is not sustain-
able if the rest of the government does not follow the same principles. 
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NATO is not just a defence organisation but also a community of 
universally applicable values, and these values have to guide all civil 
service reform. Mr. Eriksen believes that NATO tasks and chal-
lenges are complex and cannot just be addressed by one ministry alone. 
MoDs may be catalysts for wider civil service and public administra-
tion reform. However, they are currently underutilized in provid-
ing incentive for greater reform for the whole of government.
Question & Answer
At this point, the floor was opened for questions. During this time, it 
was clarified that the Serbian MoD is working on promoting its code of 
conduct so that it becomes part of the personal values of the military. 
The Georgian MoD is also intending to introduce a code of con-
duct for both military and civilian personnel. The Georgian MoD is 
still working on how to understand what people have learned with 
their training outside Georgia, but no system is in place yet.
There was also a discussion that there are certain cases where there may be 
some benefit for maintaining centers of excellence, for example separate 
units for training humanitarian crises. However, there is a body of evidence 
in public administrative reform that it is impossible to improve one min-
istry without tackling the crosscutting issues within a government.  n
What Can We Learn from Others?
Participants
Mr. Andrew Karlyn
Senior Advisor and Lead Mobile Money, USAID
Mr. Charles Chadwick
Chairman of the International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct for the  
Aerospace and Defence Industry
Ms. Renée Acosta
President, Global Impact
Summary Reported by Walter Christman, Ph.D.
The speakers in this panel presented practical examples of how to promote 
good practice—making better use of knowledge, smarter use of technology, 
and empowering good people to make good decisions. The three panelists 
were: Mr. Andrew Karlyn, Senior Advisor and Lead for Mobile Money at the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); Mr. Charles Chad-
wick, Chairman of the International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct 
(IFBEC) for the aerospace and defence industry; and Ms. Renée Acosta, 
President of Global Impact. They presented diverse points of view represent-
ing the responses of government, industry, and civil society, respectively.
Mr. Karlyn from USAID started off the session with a discussion of how 
mobile technology is being used to increase transparency and fight cor-
ruption in Afghanistan. Technology is not a magic bullet, but a tool. 
His presentation covered what corruption means to the average citizen, 
how to address corruption at the policy and implementation level, how 
technology might help in this process, and how NATO and partners 
may use technology to improve transparency and reduce corruption.
According to the 2012 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Report, 
half of Afghan adults paid bribes while requesting public services. Cumula-
tively those Afghans handed over a total of $3.9 billion. That figure is twice as 
large as Afghanistan’s domestic revenue. Total corruption cost has increased 
by some 40 per cent over the last three years to reach $3.9 billion. According 
to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction smuggling bulk 
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cash is one of the principal forms of laundering money. In 2011 alone, an 
estimated $4.5 billion was spirited out of Afghanistan to places like Dubai.
Mr. Karlyn noted that there is a market for corruption in terms of “a bribe 
price,” in which the bribe price is function of the supply of services. One 
fundamental question is how to move the price of a bribe downward. He 
cited that the key success factor to address corruption is the coupling of 
monitoring and incentives; in other words, the results of the monitoring had 
to translate into punishment, whether of a monetary nature such as a reduc-
tion in wages, or non-monetary forms such as publication of the corruption 
charges, termination of employment, or reduction of allocated funds.  
The best research, Mr. Karlyn explained, indicates that publishing infor-
mation about corrupt officials served as a deterrent to corrupt behavior 
leaving the punishment to the community, either through the ballot box or 
through other types of pressure. Some studies have focused on assessing 
results of interventions that sought to change the rules of the system, such 
as procurement auctions and decentralization approaches. Findings suggest 
that infrastructure and capacity building at the local level and the degree of 
community engagement and participation in the decentralization process are 
likely to be important factors in the success of decentralization measures.
Mr. Karlyn then addressed the question: what role does technology play? He 
gave a series of examples of mobile solutions on how mobile money acceler-
ates financial inclusion, roots out corruption, and unlocks the private sector. 
Mobile data empowers citizens and improves decision making, while mobile 
access and mobile payments probably have the most transformative impact.  
Mr. Charles Chadwick, Chairman of the IFBEC, explained in his presenta-
tion the role of IFBEC as an international organisation focused on the pro-
motion of ethical business conduct worldwide in its industry. IFBEC mem-
bers have developed and published a set of “Global Principles of Business,” 
and IFBEC membership provides an opportunity to exchange information 
on best practices. The global principles focus on zero tolerance of corruption. 
The IFBEC is an attempt at self-governance within the industry. Mr. Chad-
wick cited General Electric CEO Jack Welsh, who said, “If we don’t regulate, 
someone will.” There is a general belief that industry needs to be involved 
in the sharing of best practices to combat corruption, because governments 
cannot stop corrupt practices solely by themselves. By imposing regulations 
in the industry, it may be possible to catch corrupt behaviors closer to the 
source, before it spreads. Industry self-governance is about prevention. 
Further, all firms compete against each other, and the competition should 
be on a level playing field. Corruption tilts the field and allows for unfair 
competition. Finally, Mr. Chadwick argued that the IFBEC was also a moral 
obligation, citing the figure of one trillion dollars in bribes worldwide, or 
five percent of gross domestic production, all of which deprives citizens.
Big companies joined the IFBEC first and realized the need to help small 
companies. In 2009, IFBEC promulgated the global principles, leading to 
sharing of best practices, a gathering of multi-stakeholders, and pushing 
for a pilot programme that would lead to public accountability reports. 
Within the industry, there is now an established a working group to develop 
a tool for risk mitigation that smaller companies and suppliers can use. Mr. 
Chadwick emphasized the need for outreach, stating that if only the U.S. and 
Europe do well, it is not enough. The task of fighting corruption needs to 
expand; global islands of excellence are not an alternative. Corruption can’t 
be fought in isolation, because there is a demand side and a supply side.  
Rene Acosta of Global Impact followed and represented the point of view of 
civil society and philanthropy. She noted that government, industry, and civil 
society must come together in a multi-stakeholder partnership, as the effec-
tive roles between them have become very blurred. She asked: what can each 
learn from the other if stovepipes prevail? The role of government is to pro-
vide safety and security, as well as infrastructure. The role of NGOs, IOs, and 
nonprofits is to provide humanitarian assistance and developmental techni-
cal assistance. The role of the private sector is to focus on economic growth. 
She provided data showing that in 2010 U.S. private philanthropy invest-
ment surpassed assistance from the U.S. government ($39 billion vs. $30.4 
billion), and that public-private partnerships are on the rise. Government, 
plus business, plus NGOs is the new model of Public Private Partnerships.  
Ms. Acosta believes that universities have a role as well because academia is 
a place of innovation. She noted that university campuses are increasingly 
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involved in aid and development. Global Impact assists them in terms of 
programme outcomes and financial outcomes. Companies are seeking part-
ners and looking for innovative projects and partnerships in the developing 
world because they are looking for a competitive advantage, and most eco-
nomic growth happens outside of mature markets. Companies have found 
that social well-being affects the bottom line. For example, Coca Cola has a 
corporate social responsibility project focused on clean water. This is because 
safe water for bottling Coke is key. Essentially, they are in the water busi-
ness, and if public infrastructure isn’t up to standard, they have to step in. 
This raises the question: “What does it take to build multi-stakeholder 
partnership?” According to Ms. Acosta, partnerships between gov-
ernments, NGOs, and corporations are complex and require:
1. Strategies with realistic and attainable goals,
2. Adequate resources,
3. Trust between partners,
4. Parties to be explicit about goals and results, 
5. Accountability systems in place for measuring the performance 
and progress,
6. Decision-making to be effective and to good effect,
7. Roles and responsibilities are clear and understood, and
8. To be purposeful and predicated on mutual accountabilities.
Ms. Acosta outlined the guiding principles for partnership. She noted that 
determining the goal and scope of humanitarian assistance was essential. 
Parties needed to define and agree on clear expectations, outlining roles 
and responsibilities, and agreeing to financial practices. They would need 
to determine who the lead partner is, and assess the relationship and 
reputation capital of each partner. They would need to establish a system 
for frequent, open, and meaningful communications and agreeing on how 
credit and acknowledgement will be given publicly. Finally, they need to 
establish an exit strategy for all partners, including the final evaluation 
of the project, reporting results, and recommending improvements.
Examining lessons learned in projects carried out in developing nations, Ms. 
Acosta noted that it is imperative to develop the capacity of the host country 
to coordinate and implement aid. NGOs must also consult with donor 
governments on aid priorities, and to the extent feasible, locals should lead 
implementation. Aid projects should fit into a broader long-term strategy 
and be constantly monitored and evaluated for effectiveness. Aid projects 
need to understand and address the needs of the host country as well as 
work within the given political context of the country in which they are 
carried out. Beware hastily planned aid projects, Ms. Acosta advised.  n
Impact of Corruption—Recommendations
Participants
Air Commodore (Ret.) Alan Waldron
Transparency International, UK Defence Team
Mr. Bard B. Knudsen
Director, Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector, Norway
Nr. Nigel Branston
Senior Analyst, NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
Summary Reported by Jonathan Lipow, Ph.D.
This plenary session focused on the progress in combating corruption in 
the security sector. Panel members included Air Commodore Alan Wal-
dron (Ret.) of Transparency International; Mr. Bard Knudsen, Director of 
Norway’s Centre for Integrity in the Defence sector; and Nr. Nigel Branston, 
Senior Analyst at NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre.
Air Commodore Waldron began his remarks by recounting that when he 
first met Susan Pond in 2006, she had been noticeably unenthusiastic about 
meeting him, but that she had hugged him when they met at this meeting. 
He took this as evidence of the progress made in combating corruption in 
Afghanistan in the intervening seven years, and argued that Susan Pond was 
responsible for making NATO’s Building Integrity effort what it is today.
He went on to explain Transparency International’s (TI) role in combating 
corruption, and its emphasis on advocacy and the building of practical tools. 
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In particular, he emphasized the value of TI’s index of corruption in the 
defence sector. The index has a 29-point typology, allowing policy makers to 
see where their countries stood in terms of different aspects of the problem 
and where the best practices were being followed. The index also makes it 
possible to track a country’s progress. Commodore Waldron pointed out 
that while Germany and the U.S. were highly ranked on the index, Georgia 
and Bulgaria had made the most improvement over recent years. He also 
stated that Afghanistan—widely perceived to be the most corrupt country 
in TI’s sample—had also made rapid progress as measured by the index.
Commodore Waldron went on to discuss an anti-corruption index of 
defence firms that TI had developed. He mentioned that only 10 firms in 
the sample had good levels of protection against corrupt practices, and 
two-thirds of defence firms do not themselves offer adequate levels of 
transparency. Furthermore, firms that exported their products heavily 
were those with the lowest scores for transparency and accountability.
Addressing a new topic, Commodore Waldron touched on TI activi-
ties around the world, highlighting its efforts in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, 
South East Europe, and east Africa. He particularly emphasized TI’s effort 
in Afghanistan, which began in 2009. Commodore Waldron recounted 
that at the time, the Afghan military was very enthusiastic, but that the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and other international 
actors had been uninterested in TI’s effort. This had recently changed, 
and TI visited the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force—Shafafiyat 
in February 2013. Summarizing TI’s view of Afghanistan, the Com-
modore stated that bribe rates had gone down, and public confidence in 
the government had risen, but that—overall—there was still no focus, 
no interest in doctrine, and too much emphasis on kinetic operations.  
Mr. Knudsen began his remarks by stating that corruption is fraud, 
and fraud is—plain and simple—a crime. He also pointed out 
that once you commit a crime like fraud, you will commit even 
more crimes of fraud, and he described what he called the “Fraud 
Triangle”—motivation, opportunity, and rationalization.
In combating fraud, Mr. Knudsen argued that you have to attack all three 
sides of the fraud triangle at the same time, and that required understand-
ing what they were. He described various sources of motivation for fraud, 
including personal gain, a need to meet short-term goals, and a desire 
to hide bad news. Opportunity was dictated by lax controls and physical 
realities. As for rationalization, this was a function of personal integrity.
Mr. Knudsen went on to describe Norway’s effort to combat fraud in the 
defence sector. He explained that Norway’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
focused on combating opportunity and rationalization. Much of the ef-
fort involved training. Their training employs a case study method where 
trainees are introduced to complicated problems with lots of grey areas, 
and then participate in “Dilemma Training” that prepares them to deal 
with the tricky problems they will actually encounter during their service. 
Norway’s military had adopted the motto “for everything we have and ev-
erything we are” as a way of emphasizing the symbolic important of integrity 
in defence. However, Mr. Knudsen admitted that the Norwegian defence 
sector is still regarded by the Norwegian public as being corrupt. As the most 
recent step to combat this, the Centre for Integrity in the Defence sector was 
established in 2012, and Mr. Knudsen had been appointed its first director.  
Mr. Branston began his remarks by introducing the Joint Analysis and 
Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) in NATO/Allied Transformation 
Command, whose mission is to analyze NATO operations, training, 
and exercises to look for improvements. ISAF requested that the JALLC 
conduct an analysis of best practices, lessons, and challenges for combat-
ting corruption in Afghanistan and other post-conflict States in order 
to support decision-making / policy development for the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and future NATO-led operations. 
Mr. Branston reported the initial findings of the analysis, but cau-
tioned that all of the findings were preliminary. The first finding is that 
corruption handicaps operations and operations cause corruption. 
There is a tradeoff between security and integrity, and while it is at-
tractive to choose security in the short run, the long run costs of this 
were extremely high. Second, the JALLC had found that there were 
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too many actors involved in efforts to establish security and good 
governance in Afghanistan, and that this complicated all efforts.
Mr. Branston went on to touch on other issues, such as:
1. The importance that ISAF itself avoids becoming corrupt, 
2. The need to focus on Afghan MoD capacity building, and 
3. The value of media as a watchdog. 
He also stated that NATO needed to improve pre–deployment training in 
how to deal with integrity issues and that intelligence resources needed to  
be brought to bear on the problem as well.
Question & Answer
The floor was then opened for questions. The audience asked no questions, 
but the panelists discussed and debated each other’s presentations. Commo-
dore Waldron emphasized that the idea that the military shouldn’t take the 
lead in combating corruption was wrong. He stated bluntly that the United 
Nations would not produce good results, and that TI had found in Africa 
that militaries were the best equipped to deal with corruption problems. Mr. 
Knudsen added that legal participation was also important, and that public 
service laws and regulations were often ambiguous—something that greatly 
contributed to the problem. Mr. Branston closed out the session by agreeing 
that the military should be involved in combating corruption, but that it 
might be a mistake for the military to always take the lead on these issues.  n  
Are We Doing the Right Things, and Are We  
Doing Them Right?
Participants
Air Marshal Graham Stacey (UKAF)
Deputy Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Brunssum, Netherlnads
Mr. Wim Peeters
Counsellor on NATO Operations, Belgian Delegation to NATO
Mr. Kristo Perovic
Head of Defence Section, Mission of Montenegro to NATO
Ms. Susan Pond (NATO-IS)
Head of the NATO Building Integrity (BI) Program
Summary Reported by Anna Miro
At the final session of the conference, panelists were asked to address the 
challenge of developing an implementation strategy that embeds integrity, 
transparency, and accountability in the defence and security sectors. The 
panel was comprised of: Air Marshall Graham Stacey (UKAF), Deputy 
Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Brunssum; Mr. Wim Peeters, 
Counsellor on NATO Operations, Belgian Delegation to NATO; Mr. Kristo 
Perovic, Head of the Defence Section, Mission of Montenegro to NATO; and 
Ms. Susan Pond, Head of the NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme.
Air Marshall Stacey gave a presentation focusing on current and fu-
ture deployed operations. He affirmed it would be naive to think that 
Building Integrity (BI) is not at the core of what NATO does. Further, 
in not addressing BI, the international community invites a host of 
problems such as permitting resources to be wasted and permitting 
resources to be diverted to enemy forces. In turn, this allows for the 
loss of public trust, the loss of political and media support, and, as a 
result, the loss of the moral basis the intervention was based on. 
Having been in both Kosovo and Baghdad in the early days of the interven-
tions therein, Air Marshall Stacey is acutely aware of the challenges faced 
during that period. He believes that a doctrine or tool kit is essential for 
future commanders, noting the importance of building upon and learning 
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from past experiences. Given the assumption that a tool kit is needed, the 
Air Marshall reviewed what he envisioned such a tool kit would consist 
of. He believes it must be pithy, pragmatic, and progressive. It must of-
fer options and solutions, not just a list of what not to do. The tool kit 
should be useful during all phases of an intervention, from planning to 
post–conflict reconstruction and stability operations. It needs to be sup-
ported and facilitated by resources from the international community and 
sustained through training, education, and exercises. Finally, Air Marshall 
Stacey noted a need for higher-level NATO policy as well as clarifica-
tion of NATO’s ambitions. However, due to the imminent need for a tool 
kit, the international community cannot wait for NATO clarification.
Regarding the role of the military in building integrity, Air Marshall Stacey 
does believe there is a role for the military to play, especially during the 
early days of an intervention. He argued that the military is one of the only 
institutions capable of providing the necessary infrastructure within the 
initial days of an intervention. However, to be successful, the integration 
with non-military actors is vital. He underscored the necessity for trust 
between actors, and that actors must clearly communicate their strengths 
and weaknesses. He concluded by reiterating the need to learn from previous 
interventions and to not lose the momentum built towards the BI initiative.
Mr. Peeters presented on lessons learned in previous interventions 
and how they can be applied to future operations. He began by affirm-
ing the necessity of Building Integrity in future operations, specifically 
the critical nature of embedding BI in all phases of an operation. He 
cited the case of Kosovo and the corrosive legacy left behind by NATO, 
which remains an institutional memory of the local population. 
Mr. Peeters main point was the necessity of awareness of corruption at all 
levels, from a platoon commander to high command. One problem the 
international community faces is that almost by definition, the arrival of an 
international presence is poor and disorganized. He cited specific examples 
of unintended corruption created by NATO operations such as: the wage 
difference between international soldiers and local soldiers; the inflated 
prices paid by international soldiers to local suppliers; and inadvertently 
creating local power brokers. He noted the need for cultural awareness to 
counter these unintended consequences. Mr. Peeters explained that NATO 
unknowingly gives a seal of approval to corrupt practices by allowing them 
to arise and not combatting them, creating a corrosive cycle of corrup-
tion among the local population. He believes that NATO must become 
aware that the situation exists and that they are inadvertently the source. 
Mr. Peeters argued that there are three specific moments during an operation 
that are more permissive to corruption than others. The first is the entrance 
into an operation, where the international community has to move very 
quickly. A second is when the operation moves from war fighting to the 
stabilization and reconstruction phase. In this second moment there are all 
of the challenges faced when setting up contracts, determining the process of 
contracts and wages, and deciding whom to work with. The third susceptible 
moment is the drawdown, wherein others take up the operation. Often 
there is a lack of regulation and transparency in this transition process, and 
the availability of resources is suddenly greatly diminished. He concluded 
by stating that BI can only function if the entire international community 
applies the same standards and employs a comprehensive approach.
Mr. Perovic discussed the changing role of NATO in the post–Cold War 
era, and its move towards fostering good governance, building integrity, 
and building institutions. He stated that Montenegro is very proud to 
have completed the BI Self Assessment, and plans to continue working 
with NATO experts. He noted that completing the assessment led to 
improvements in interagency cooperation. While corruption is very sensi-
tive issue in many countries, Mr. Perovic advocated that Allied countries 
serve as a good example to Partner Nations by completing the Self As-
sessment, demonstrating their commitment to addressing corruption. 
Mr. Perovic suggested that a comprehensive approach to building integrity 
courses should include a wider scope of people invited from all aspects of 
society,including the media. He addressed the notion of a regional ap-
proach to corruption, citing the South East Europe (SEE) Initiative as a 
good example. Additionally, he believes that the international community 
should not limit themselves to the SEE and Afghanistan approaches, but 
consider opportunities for engagement in places such as Mali, where NATO 
troops are not on the ground. Mr. Perovic concluded by stating it would be 
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useful to have the Building Integrity Compendium into various languages, 
and expressed his hope to organize a BI conference in Montenegro.
Ms. Pond presented an evaluation of the BI Initiative, focusing on what 
has been done well and what could be done better. In designing the BI 
Initiative, the biggest questions that needed to be answered were: 
1. How to build trusted institutions, 
2. How to make the security sector an engine for good governance, and
3. How to pay it forward to the region.
Ms. Pond gave an overview of the things the international community 
did right. She highlighted the focus on prevention and raising aware-
ness to reduce the risk of corruption. She noted that participation in 
BI is completely voluntary, and yet NATO has eight countries lined up 
to take the Self Assessment this year. Additionally, almost all materi-
als are unclassified, which makes it highly accessible and transparent. 
Organizers understood at the outset that training and education is the 
way to sustain change. Finally, the international community recog-
nized that there is no one size fits all approach to BI, emphasizing the 
tailored approaches taken in South East Europe and Afghanistan. 
Ms. Pond continued by giving her recommendations of what could be done 
better in the future. She believes that the Self Assessment tool should be 
revisited and adjustments made to the questions. The tool should expand 
to incorporate measures of performance. She recommended linking BI to 
NATO operations, noting the need for better understanding of the strategic 
impact of corruption on operations and corruption as an obstacle to peace. 
Since the introduction of large-scale operations (humanitarian and military) 
contributes to corruption, NATO needs to apply good practices so they 
can better cooperate with partners on the ground. Ms. Pond recommended 
ensuring lessons learned are reflected in all phases of planning. Finally, she 
underscored the need for the creation of a central document capturing the 
most important aspects of BI. This document would provide basic principles 
that every nation could work towards, and everyone could use as a basis. 
Question & Answer
The Chairman then opened up the floor for comments and questions. The first 
participant expressed his support for the suggestion made by Mr. Perovic that 
Allies also conduct BI Self Assessments. The Allies should lead by example, 
and doing so would improve NATO’s image. A second participant echoed the 
point made by the first. He stated he holds courses on leadership and building 
integrity, and few “old” members of NATO (Allies) participate; his courses are 
mostly attended by Partner Nations. He reiterated that it is just as important 
for large states to participate in BI exercises as it is for Partner Nations. 
A third participant noted the line between crime, corruption, and the 
State must be broken. A fourth participant commented on integrity and 
ethics, suggesting that while NATO focuses at the institutional level, they 
may be missing the boat by not focusing on the people in those institu-
tions. Further, the participant added that while most young cadets receive 
some form of integrity training, there is little continued education as 
officers move up throughout their professional career. The participant 
suggested that Allied Command Transformation could look at best prac-
tices for reinforcing ethics training throughout officers’ careers.  n
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Syndicate 1
Reducing Corruption Risks in Capability/Programme 
Development and Budgeting through Investments in 
Integrity, Transparency and Accountability
Led by
Ms. Susan Pond (NATO-IS)
Head of NATO Building Integrity (BI) Program
Dr. Francois Melese
Executive Director, DRMI
Summary Reported by Samantha Schwellenbach
I.  Introduction  
Syndicate 1 explored good practices in financial control and ac-
countability. The following questions were distributed ahead 
of time as “food for thought” for the discussions:
1. What are the core capabilities required in the defence 
and security sector? 
2. Can these be measured or benchmarked to promote good practice
and help nations map the development of capabilities/performance?  
To frame the discussions, Syndicate 1 broke the topic into two primary areas, 
the first to identify risks in building the defence budget and the second 
to ascertain cost effective mitigation techniques to combat these risks. A 
total of approximately thirty (30) persons participated in Syndicate 1. 
II.  Key Elements of Discussion   
1) The first step to increasing transparency and reducing corruption in 
the budget process is to have a coherent interagency approach to develop-
ing clear national security and defence strategies. If the strategies are 
unclear, it becomes difficult to link the budget/resources to the mission 
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and thus “the budget is built on sand.” Conflicting objectives amongst key 
stakeholders increases the risk of corruption as interested parties compete 
for larger portions of the budget. With both internal influence by elected 
or appointed officials and the armed services, and external influence by 
profit (or not for profit) companies and other private contractors, lobbying 
occurs. The quality (and accuracy) of information and personnel utilized to 
build the budget plays a role in the integrity of the budget. Many revenue 
streams such as donor aid and military revenues are opaque. For example, 
in Chile a percentage of copper mining revenues goes directly to fund a 
portion of the military. Often there are off budget expenditures, such as 
black programmes, that should be included in the budget. Additionally, 
there are often on budget expenditures that maybe should not be included 
in the budget. These are frequently a reflection of special interests. 
2) Increased transparency in which senior civilian and military leadership 
clearly articulate and regularly update national security direction would 
better help to guide planning. Linking capability-based requirements to the 
security strategy would assist in the implementation of such strategy. Fre-
quent training and enforcement of codes of ethics/conduct would increase 
the integrity and reduce corruption of personnel involved in the budget 
process. Creation of a semi-autonomous oversight committee and costing 
office to ensure accurate estimates would assist in the integrity of the budget. 
III. Final Distillation of Key Elements  
One of the common themes in the syndicate discussion was affirmation 
that there must be clear national security and defence strategies to al-
low for linkage of capabilities based requirements to the aforementioned 
plans. Internal lobbying seemed to be of particular concern, especially 
the possibility that armed forces may choose to implement their own 
agendas rather than to follow the strategy of the elected government. There 
is often a lack of transparency in the military budgeting process, which 
limits both the legislative and public potential to act as oversight bodies. 
Strategic management of personnel and ensuring that the right per-
sonnel are in the right place in the budget process helps to improve 
integrity. Also of concern is the competence and integrity of personnel 
involved in developing the budget. A number of syndicate participants 
spoke of the idea of a “monopoly of expertise,” in which the required 
knowledge is shared amongst a small number of people. In this case, 
you must be careful to not lose the ability to have oversight. 
IV. Conclusions (Syndicate out brief session)
Dr. Francois Melese, the Syndicate 1 leader, highlighted the themes ad-
dressed in the above sections and emphasized the importance of mitigating 
corruption risks in the budgeting process. Important concepts include: 
awareness that the legal use of public funds builds trust and confidence in 
institutions; the efficient use of funds minimizes the burden of defence on 
taxpayers; and the effective use of funds guarantees best possible outcomes.
V.  Expected Action Items and Outcomes 
Periodic strategic reviews should be required to evaluate cohesiveness 
between the national security and strategies. Military capabilities must be  
in accordance with the outlined strategies. Increased transpar-
ency of budgets would allow for scrutiny from both the press and 
the public. Assuring the integrity and accountability of person-
nel developing the budget would reduce the corruption risk.  n 
Syndicate 2
Reducing Corruption Risks in Budget Execution, Contracting 
and Acquisition through Investments in Integrity, 
Transparency, and Accountability
Led by
Dr. Elisabeth Wright (CPCM)
International Defense Acquisition Resource Management Program
Mr. Cory Yoder
Faculty, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, NPS
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Summary Reported by Cory Yoder
I.  Introduction  
Syndicate 2 was chartered to explore good practices in budget execu-
tion and acquisition. Syndicate 2 embraced its charter in the context 
of reducing risks in budget execution and acquisition in the defence 
and security sectors, and specifically explored concepts for promoting 
good practice and enhancing the Building Integrity (BI) Tool Kit.  
II. Background  
An examination of the background of Syndicate 2 is important to prop-
erly understand the context of the mission, specific questions addressed, 
the discussion framework, and mix of participants. As with all syndicate 
sessions, Chatham House rules were in effect, and thus, the participants 
and proceedings, along with this Compendium Addendum were and are 
subject to the protocol stating, “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held 
under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information 
received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor 
that of any other participant, may be revealed.” (Chatham House, 2013) 
Key mission elements and questions of the syndicate session:
An initial Syndicate 2 “food for thought” paper was circulated 
prior to and again at the 2013 BI conference and was utilized to 
stimulate lines of inquiry and thinking of participants. Ques-
tions were posed within the initial Syndicate 2 paper including: 
1. What core capabilities are required in the defence and security sector?
2. Can these be measured or benchmarked to promote good practice
and help nations map the development of capabilities/performance?
Additionally, two Syndicate 2 leaders/facilitators developed lines of 
questioning germane to the overarching mission of reducing risks 
in budget execution and acquisition in the defence and security sec-
tors, and specifically explored concepts for promoting good prac-
tice and enhancing the BI Tool Kit. These questions included:
1. What can/should be done to strengthen enforcement 
of integrity-focused laws and policies?
2. Are laws and policies for enhanced transparency and 
oversight in place?
3. Are laws and policies enforced?  
4. What mechanisms are available for transparency and oversight?
Framework for conducting and executing the syndicate session:
The Syndicate 2 working group was chartered to examine and identify 
ways to build integrity, increase transparency, and improve account-
ability—with emphasis on reducing corruption risks in Budget Execu-
tion, Contracting, and Acquisition. Syndicate 2 utilized two discussion 
leaders/facilitators and employed a professional rapporteur to effectively 
capture key discussion elements, and associated recommendations.  
Mix of participants: 
Syndicate 2 was co-led and facilitated by Dr. Elizabeth Wright and E. Cory 
Yoder, both from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Participants 
came from seven countries representing Ministries of Defence, private 
contractors/stakeholders, NATO nations, NATO aspirant nations, and 
others. In total, fifteen persons participated in the Syndicate 2 proceedings. 
III.  Key Elements of Discussion 
Initial facilitation and discussions centered around identifying areas of 
concern and those affecting transparency and accountability within NATO 
operations. Of particular note is that each participating nation, and the con-
tracting organisations within the purview and administrative control of that 
nation, sets the “rules” for the conduct of business. While the participating 
nation control has been heralded as the way to do business, based on existing 
national law and regulation of those participating nations, several problems 
were identified with this practice. First, laws, regulations, and customs may 
vary widely from country to country, presenting a disarray of commonly 
accepted standards organic to NATO operations. While several noteworthy 
Private Volunteer Organisation and Non-Governmental Organisational 
standards have been referenced as benchmarks, there is no NATO policy 
or published tenets of ethical and transparent business practices in place. 
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Hence, various nations and participants within the same theater of operation 
may apply a rather ad hoc set of rules. This has created opportunities for 
less than transparent and often corrupt practices, including single source 
procurement, where adequate competition could and should have been 
employed, and money used as an award facilitator (bribery), and worse. 
How could NATO create a more unified set of rules, principles, or tenets, 
and how could they be enforced? Syndicate 2 participants agreed that 
it is essential that NATO institute some key business tenets organically 
(i.e. within NATO). First, NATO needs a Building Integrity “knight” 
or champion. This could be an ombudsman of sorts, depending on 
the desired functionality of the NATO position. They would have to 
function as a senior integrity officer—a compliance officer, senior 
transparency officer, and senior accountability officer. They would re-
quire a strong charter over the areas of the ministry to allow them to 
develop, promulgate, implement, and monitor the BI business tenants 
(yet to be developed) and to enhance integrity. They must be account-
able to NATO Chief of Staff as an independent reporting authority.  
Additionally, Syndicate 2 examined the personnel, platforms,  
and protocols that are required to make universal BI business  
tenets effective and efficient. This framework was proffered by  
the Syndicate 2 leaders-facilitators as a practical way to examine the 
maturity of the business rules, guidance, and adherence to the same. 
“Personnel” refers to having the right people, with the right credentials 
and authority, able to plan and execute finance and procurement at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Personnel training is essential, 
but without established tenets of ethical business conduct such training 
would be pointless. Currently, NATO lacks the personnel and resources, 
as developing, promulgating, and monitoring business tenets has not been 
a NATO priority. The Syndicate participants believe that this MUST be a 
NATO priority for meeting goals of integrity and transparency.  
“Platforms” refers to the systems of business communications and IT systems 
utilized to plan and conduct business, both within finance and contracting/
procurements. Since multi-national participants may bring their own sys-
tems or platforms, developing transparency and a common NATO frame-
work may be challenging. But, having established business platforms with 
common business tenets at play, if adopted, this may not be too difficult.  
“Protocols” in this context, refers to the laws, regulations, direction, 
and agreements which govern the conduct of business. This area, along 
with personnel, is of the utmost importance, as per Syndicate 2. Here, 
the protocols are viewed as a composite of sovereign nation partici-
pants laws, regulations, and guidance, and a yet to be developed set of 
key NATO tenets of ethical business operations for participants.  
Within the aforementioned framework for analysis, the syndi-
cate determined that NATO must come up with common stan-
dards for business ethics and tenets for sound operations.  
IV.  Conclusions (Syndicate out brief session)
Throughout the syndicate, participants emphasized the need for national 
self-determination, incentives for accepting NATO tenets (if and when 
they are established and promulgated), and training of national and inter-
national stakeholders. Additionally, respect for sovereignty of participants 
will require an integrative approach to the formulation and adoption of key 
BI business tenets. If nations are part of the formulation and promulga-
tion process, they are more likely to be willing participants to the imple-
mentation. Specific concerns expressed include, but are not limited to: 
1. NATO should work within the international organisations/
mechanisms we have. Use the Individual Partnership Action Plan, 
Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process.
2. NATO needs a strategic-level adaptation of key tenets of operation
within business and financial participants. 
3. Sovereign legal frameworks are adequate and acceptable, 
although necessary commonality is lacking in the NATO  
specific business arena. 
4. Most nations lack sufficiency in personnel, resources, and facilities to 
adequately perform necessary implementation of monitoring and 
oversight processes in remote regions of operation. 
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5. Culture in emergent countries may struggle to adopt more 
open and transparent protocols needed to safeguard public funds 
administration. Cultural change is needed.
Syndicate 2 was clear and unequivocal in its expressed belief that NATO 
common standards or tenets be adopted and put into practice. This 
translated into out-briefings which emphasized these principles and made 
further examination of the mechanisms which could be utilized to effect 
such adaptation and implementation. During the out-briefing, Syndicates 
2 and 4 proposed utilizing NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 
as proffered as a means to determine the key tenets, have sovereign review, 
and ultimate adaptation at the strategic level. This was well-received by other 
participants at the brief, as most believed the common key tenets approach 
would foster ‘buy-in” at the strategic level and allow for a more integrated 
force planning and execution structure for current and future operations. 
V.  Expected Action Items and Outcomes 
Syndicate 2 successfully addressed, in a very succinct manner, the 
nature of the problems faced by NATO operators in the business and 
financial arenas, and developed sound concepts for future NATO Build-
ing Integrity initiatives. These concepts included the following: 
1. Key BI business tenets must be agreed to, published and 
promulgated among all NATO participants.
2. Tenets, once in place, must be monitored by participants to 
ensure they are achieved. 
3. Common key tenets must be used to transform self-assessment, 
legislation (as required), and sovereign business practices.
4. Ensure that self-determination, incentives, and proper training 
take place for any newly adopted tenets.
5. NATO force planning and operational planning must incorporate 
provisions for adopting and utilizing key tenets.   
While many of the presentations during the 2013 NATO BI Conference 
addressed/identified the “problems”, Syndicate 2 purposely charted the next 
step by ensuring a workable framework for the next stage of the process is 
recognized and publicized for NATO consideration. First, NATO should 
charter a STANAG working group with the mission of determining and 
publishing key tenets of business operating standards for transparency and 
accountability for NATO participants (nations and non-nationals). Second, 
the key BI business tenets, once approved and promulgated, should be 
included in force structure and operations planning design constructs at 
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These elements are urgently 
needed. NATO should commence these efforts and functions immediately 
to create the desired effect for current and future operations. The next 
scheduled NATO BI Conference should have as part of its charter a mandate 
for reviewing progress in creating and promulgating the key tenets, and 
in incorporating them throughout the military and business personnel, 
platforms, and protocols essential for effective and efficient adaptation.  n 
Syndicate 3
What are We Doing Currently in Theater to Reduce the 
Corruption Risk?  Do We Have the Right Procedures and 
Guidance to Support Effective Civil-Military Cooperation in 
Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Governance Efforts?
Led by
Joint Forces Command Brunssum  
SHAPE, and Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre 
Summary Reported by Maj Mike McPherson
I.  Introduction  
he 2013 BI Conference Syndicate 3 focused on the operational concerns 
and implications of corruption currently being observed on the ground 
in Afghanistan. It also considered the corruption has on ongoing military 
and civilian efforts. The breakout session was attended by approximately 
40 individuals, and most individuals had considerable experience in 
Afghanistan with firsthand experience of the impacts of corrupt activi-
ties on ongoing operations. Four questions were posed to the group to 
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guide the discussion. As with all syndicate sessions, Chatham House 
rules were in effect. Thus, the participants and proceedings, along with 
this Compendium Addendum, were and are subject to the protocol 
stating, “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham 
House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but 
neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of 
any other participant, may be revealed.” (Chatham House, 2013)    
II. Framework for Conducting and Executing the  
     Syndicate Session 
Syndicate 3 was focused on the operational impacts of corruption, and 
the discussion was broken down to four discussion areas. Focus ques-
tions were used to guide discussion in each area and were as follow: 
1. What are we doing currently in theatre to reduce the risk 
of corruption?
2. Do we have the right procedures and guidance to support effective 
civil-military cooperation in stabilization, reconstruction and 
governance efforts?  
3. What are the main concerns regarding the impact of corruption 
in Afghanistan?
4. What areas should be improved? 
III.  Key Elements of Discussion 
Question 1: What are we doing currently in theatre to reduce the risk 
   of corruption?  
Several comments and insights were provided involving military and non-
military actors; however, most of the comments were presented with caveats.  
For example: “Making payments through the Afghan process has its pluses 
and minuses. It forces Afghans to do the work, thus they learn the processes, 
and they can be held accountable, but it also means we have to give up 
control of financial resources and in some cases this leads to corruption.” 
On the civilian side it was noted as a positive that international groups 
and Afghans alike are focusing more on legitimate agriculture devel-
opment, small business growth, women run businesses, and school 
systems. These were all noted as positive steps towards lowering cor-
ruption; however, they have not had a significant impact yet.
Reporting of corruption is also on the upswing due to increased means of 
reporting offenders. Anonymous anti-corruption hotlines and cell phone 
applications have been established, and a limited but growing amount of 
Afghan media coverage has increased transparency and public scrutiny. Ad-
ditionally, the Ministry of Finance publishes a “Citizens Budget” summary 
document every year which increases public awareness of public budgeting.   
On several occasions the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework was held 
up as positive step forward towards reducing corruption. At the international 
level it effectively establishes conditions that Afghanistan must achieve in 
order for the country to receive continued funding from partner nations. 
A U.S. military representative in the syndicate cited the U.S. Money as a 
Weapon System (MAAWS) operating instruction as a good tool towards 
safeguarding coalition funds because it standardizes processes, and it is 
universally accepted as the authoritative document in theater. It is also 
updated on annual bases to ensure processes are current and neither to 
loose nor too restrictive. The success of the MAAWS-Afghanistan was 
cited due to the fact it was generated in Afghanistan for Afghanistan, 
so it is tailored specifically for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. It 
was acknowledged that it is not a perfect document, but it does have 
buy in from all coalition members and reduces corruption through 
standardization and communication. Thus, it helps strengthens weak 
processes that are more susceptible to corruption and manipulation. 
Recent uses of technology have also been leveraged to reduce cor-
ruption. For example, the Ministry of Finance website is used to 
publish the Afghan budget documents, which increases transparency 
and public commentary. Another example cited was forcing truck-
ing contractors to use GPS tracking devices on trucks that are mov-
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ing coalition supplies in Afghanistan. This has significantly reduced 
the amount of pilferages and other unexplained losses of supplies. 
Finally a positive and significant anti-corruption process noted was the 
strong contracting and contract management procedures used by the NATO 
Support Agency (NSPA) Logistics organisation. The NSPA management 
processes were developed on the ground in Afghanistan and designed in part 
to prevent corruption through tight contract oversight processes, transpar-
ency, contractor screening, and good documentation. It was stated that the 
NSPA contracting and management processes should be benchmarked, and 
NSPA should be leveraged to manage coalition contracts more widely. 
Question 2: Do we have the right procedures and guidance to support 
  effective civil-military cooperation in stabilization,  
                      reconstruction, and governance efforts?  
The overall answer to this question is no. Syndicates participant cited the 
disparity between the mission and cultures of the State Department and 
Department of Defense as an example because of the apparent dysfunctional 
and often counterproductive relationship. Additionally, there is often an 
oppositional relationship between coalition military forces and NGOs 
operating in theater, with each stating the others are often getting in the way 
of progress. 
The “Golden Hour” policy also has an impact on civil-military relations. 
This policy essentially limits U.S. military from traveling more than one 
hour away from medical facilities. Thus, the military cannot provide security 
in remote areas where non-military government and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) operating are conducting operations. Because the 
military is often required to provide security for non-military organisations, 
they too are limited by the “Golden Hour” policy. As the coalition decreases 
the number of military in theater, the areas where U.S. personnel can go 
will be even more limited and reduces the effectiveness in remote areas. 
Another problem cited as a civil-military issue was related to the com-
mon Afghan perception of U.S. military as having all the money and 
strength, so the Afghan officials only want to work with the military. This 
subverts the efforts of the civilian agencies working on the ground.   
Question 3: What are the main concerns regarding the impact of 
   corruption in Afghanistan?
The participants all agreed that there are two primary concerns regarding 
corruption in the operational environment. First, it subverts the author-
ity of the government because the people do not trust their government 
officials. This lack of trust creates a lack of buy in and lack of adherence to 
the law of the land. This catch 22 is a vicious cycle that is extremely difficult 
to get out of. The second main concern is that the funding is taken directly 
from the people of Afghanistan and severely limits the effectiveness of 
donor country funding efforts. Many donor countries are now threatening 
to refuse continued support if corruption is not brought under check.
The growth of poppy cultivation was cited as a very concerning develop-
ment as it pertains to Afghan rule of law and creates a ripe environment 
for corruption. It creates a source of funding for maligned actors and 
a black market that spreads to other areas of the economy. In recent 
years, increases in Afghan heroin uses have had a devastating impact 
on the civilian and government (military/police) population.  
Another major concern voiced by the syndicate participants was that Afghan 
people do not feel empowered, and the people in authoritative positions 
in government do not feel beholden to Afghan citizens. The democratic 
process only works if officials fear the power of the people to vote them out 
of office or impact their career in some way. Without this check and balance 
provided by the general public, corruption appears to have flourished.  
The idea that corruption is in the eye of the beholder was brought up 
as a concern. If corruption is accepted by senior officials in the Afghan 
government, it ceases to be an act of corruption and becomes a culture 
of corruption. It is much harder to clean up a culture of corruption 
because fewer people actually believe in the cause, and more people are 
corrupt. Some participants argued that the acceptance of corruption is 
cultural in and of itself. “The people may not like it but they feel power-
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less to change it, and in some ways they benefit from it. At a minimum 
they know how the system works.” There are some benefits to the Afghan 
people even if they are not participating in corrupt acts themselves. For 
example police who take bribes or collect dues on the street would not 
have enough money to support their families based on their salary alone. 
The ability for police to extort money keeps the position desirable and 
ensures there are police on the street acting as a deterrent to insurgents. 
Strong but corrupt warlords also provide some measure of security in 
areas where the federal government cannot reach. “Corruption may not 
be in the blood of the people, but it may be useful to them is some ways.”   
There was a concern raised which claimed some coalition “vetting” 
programmes such as the Afghan Trucking Network programme or 
other coalition programmes are often seen as buying off local war lords 
in exchange for safe transport. This, some participant argue, gives war 
lords and powerful businessmen more power, promotes corruption, 
and subverts the authority of the central and local governments. 
Finally, it was noted that the “Afghan way” and the “official way” as out-
lined in Afghan laws, decrees, and policies supported by the coalition are 
different. This creates an environment where no one trusts the proposed 
system to work. The Afghan way refers to a multitude of collateral and 
often creative means of getting supplies, services or event supporting 
one’s self or family. The problem is that it often comes in the form of cor-
ruption. On top of this, “Many do not perceive that anyone is being hurt 
by the corruption because it is American money, not Afghan money”. 
Question 4: What areas should be improved? 
It was recognized in the Syndicate that in the rush to establish Afghan 
institutions, many processes and systems were not well thought out. In 
practice many of the systems and processes stood up by the coalition are 
not functional or even necessary. For example, in some cases schools and 
hospitals were built when there was no population to support. Another 
example cited was the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) logistics 
system. The logistics doctrine was designed at time when the country had 
zero infrastructures and was designed to appease certain Afghan individu-
als or offices in the process. It has been nearly ten years since the ANSF 
logistics system was stood up, and it has undergone only minor changes 
despite that fact that the entire infrastructure of the country has changed 
as well as the organisational structure of the ANSF. This incongruence 
between existing processes and reality encourage non-official and even 
corrupt ways of conducting government business. Many official processes 
need to be examined for plausibility and see if they need to be amended. It is 
understood, however, that this is difficult as high level Afghan officials have 
to approve changes, and they may have reasons not to make this a priority; it 
is too hard, controversial, or the current environment favors their interests. 
Another comment suggested was the coalition should stop avoiding the 
promotion of using computer based systems in the ANSF. The excuse given 
“Afghans are not ready for it” is not sufficient in the face of the current 
situation. Afghanistan will fall further and further behind if they do not 
enter the computer age in earnest. As long as hand carried paper is the 
only means of transferring data, corruption will find ways of subverting 
the system with no way to trace and expose it. Additionally, inefficient 
processes take longer, causing frustration, discontent with the government, 
and creating the need for black market processes for obtaining supplies and 
services. Automated processes will enable better transparency and record 
keeping too. As more Afghans become computer proficient this change 
will come regardless. Continuing to develop paper intensive processes 
wastes resources and only delays the inevitable. Assisting the Afghan move 
to computers will be much easier with computer savvy coalition forces in 
country to assist than it will be after the majority of foreigners have left. 
It was also stated that better controls of coalition resources are needed and 
that corrupt individuals need to be held accountable and made an example 
of. Ultimately corruption is of greatest concern to those whose resources 
are being squandered. One participant in the syndicate said it this way, “The 
Santa Clause culture is very damaging because the Afghans do not appreci-
ate the resources they have been given, and they don’t take care of them”. 
Contributing nations have to do a better job of tracking their own funding 
after it is sent to Afghanistan and ensure the intended use of the funds is be-
ing achieved. Currently it appears that no one is being held accountable for 
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corruption or incompetence. This must change. If there is no fear of penalty 
for inappropriate behavior, it soon becomes normal and accepted behavior.
Continuity of effort must be improved. “Lessons learned are not well 
distributed, recorded, or taught to incoming personnel”. Leadership 
in all civil military organisation must make continuity a high prior-
ity. Losing corporate knowledge due to rotations is a fact of life, but 
we must find better ways of retaining corporate knowledge and ex-
perience when people leave. It must be integrated into training and 
daily activities. No plan of action to address corruption will work if it 
does not last through the first set of action officer and leadership. 
It was also agreed on by the syndicate that proper training on build-
ing institutional integrity and anti-corruption techniques should be 
included in the training requirements for incoming personnel. It is 
believed this would help create greater awareness of ongoing efforts, 
foster continuity, and increase communication between all players. 
Finally, communication between coalition actors needs to be better. There 
are so many actors in theater, and few people know who other actors are 
or what they’re doing. In some cases combat operations are taking place 
in the same locations that NGOs are operating. While this is bound to 
happen in a war zone, it should be a constant focus of everyone involved 
to know who is operating around them and what other coalition efforts 
are being conducted. Corruption thrives when coalition partners do not 
know who is responsible for what action, and when a fabricated need is 
confused with a bonafide need. Better communication will help to estab-
lish actual resource requirements, fair pricing, and safer relationships. 
IV. Conclusions (Syndicate out brief session)
The Syndicate 3 out brief session detailed the corruption risks currently 
facing the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mis-
sion. The Syndicate believes that corruption is the number one risk to 
the ISAF mission. Efforts to counter corruption are being hampered by 
the lack of a “Safe and Secure Environment” (SASE), a lack of “Freedom 
of Movement” (FOM), and the fact that military planning is short term 
while counter-corruption is long term. Shortfalls in the military power 
of NATO forces and the uncertainty of NATO’s role post 2014 may also 
lead to increasing corruption. Several host nation factors may also affect 
the growth of corruption such as resources becoming scarce, a depen-
dency economy, and a lack of proper assessment of the environment 
regarding prices, wages, etc. by outside (non-local) organisations.
Many of the difficulties can be traced to proper personnel manage-
ment (the right person in the right position) and the continu-
ity seen within the positions. Othe r difficulties arise due to a 
lack of coordination between key stakeholders and actors within 
theater as well as a lack of a common long-term strategy.
The syndicate identified the need for a unified, overarching policy which 
should be comprised of guidelines rather than dictates as “one size does not 
fit all”. This policy should incorporate existing guiding principles, should 
create an approach for effective civil-military cooperation, and should be 
incorporated in NATO training. There are several existing policies docu-
ments that could form a basis for this overarching policy such as the ISAF 
Evidence based operations and quality control through the overall contract-
ing/procurement process, the policy “Afghan First”, and the U.S. document 
“Money as a Weapon System”. However, these could be much improved 
in the development of the global policy. A task force needs to be created 
to lead the development and implementation of the integrated framework 
into the campaign plan. The syndicate also felt that while countering 
corruption is not core role for military, the negative effect of corruption 
erodes the military mission. Integration of the other key stakeholders 
is essential in order for this process to work and to create a successful 
and sustainable fight against corruption. If successful, the initiative will 
promote good governance, a stable host nation, and a strong economy.
V.  Expected Action Items and Outcomes
Over the last 12 years, the coalition presence has led to the flooding 
of Afghanistan with billions of dollars in war time and reconstruc-
tion funds, but with poor controls and oversight over those funds. 
This along with other contributing illicit activities has produced a 
Syndicate Sessions
Building Integrity | Conference Proceedings
Page 36 
situation ripe for corruption. There is currently a tremendous in-
ternational focus on reducing corruption in Afghanistan; however, 
there are several weak areas that must be addressed before it can be 
expected to have a meaningful impact on operations in Afghanistan.  
Syndicate 3 evaluated the operational impacts of corruption in both 
the military and civilian sectors. There are a number of ¬construc-
tive procedures and tools in place which help to mitigate corruption 
in Afghanistan; however, the impact of corruption continues to have 
a detrimental effect on operations. The participants of Syndicate 3 
produced several observations and proposed courses of actions in-
tended to further reduce corruption, but implementation will take a 
coordinated effort and significant involvement from senior leaders 
in both the Afghan and coalition civilian and military realms.  n
Syndicate 4
How Should NATO Prepare for Future Operations?  What are 
the Best Practices and Lessons Learned from Theatre?
Led by
Captain Morten Svinndal and Mr. John Kelley
Allied Command Transformation (ACT)
Summary Reported by Max Kidalov, JD, LLM and MAJ Cristian Ivanescu 
I.  Introduction  
Syndicate 4, using building integrity lessons, best practices, and 
principles in NATO command structure, education, and train-
ing, explored the positive and negative factors affecting the abil-
ity to maintain building integrity standards, both by NATO and 
other stakeholders, within the field of operations in Afghanistan. 
II. Key Elements of Discussion 
NATO has a tailored educational and training system/process which targets 
different phases of military operational planning, different political and 
military decision-making levels, and different military communities (staff, 
logistics, line, etc.). It is presently preparing for transition from post–Af-
ghanistan interoperable engagement to interoperable preparedness under 
the rubric of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). CFI emphasizes com-
mon education, exercise, and training of the joint NATO Response Force 
as well individual forces of NATO Alliance members. Integrity is crucial to 
cohesion of NATO Alliance forces. A great education and training structure 
has been achieved through the endorsement and approval of the Building 
Integrity (BI) Strategic Training Plan, but it lacks the content. There is no 
established policy, concept, doctrine, or standards. A center of gravity for 
NATO operations is cohesion, which is highly vulnerable to the effects 
of corruption and could be seriously affected if mutual trust and faith is 
not maintained. However, it is not just trust between NATO nations and 
partners that is critical. Trust between these entities, the host nation, and 
local security forces are very important and should be considered as well.
The consensus between nations is hard to achieve. Therefore, there is a need 
for a contingency plan to overcome this current lack of an overarching, 
integrative policy. The Director General of NATO’s International Military 
Staff did not seem to believe that a policy agreement is feasible. It is possible 
that the only way forward will be to create some kind of doctrine, directive, 
or NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) at the military level that 
will be able to generate nations’ agreement. From the education and training 
perspective, this may be the best way forward until a larger policy is cre-
ated and it is immediately feasible, as we already have the lessons learned 
and best practices that were developed out of the current missions. As BI is 
very much about awareness, this will be an excellent, practical first step.
A question that remains is who has the responsibility for the coordina-
tion of these efforts. This issue was also discussed in the plenary sessions. 
Regardless of the cooperation seen in NATO, each organisation tends 
to follow its own sovereign projects and objectives. The “supported 
– supporting” concept seems not to be exploited enough. The roles 
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could shift within the cooperation framework from the “supported” 
to the “supporting” in accordance with the phase of an operation.
III. Conclusions (Syndicate out brief session) 
The time for talking about Building Integrity is over, and there is a press-
ing operational need to capture, use, and train BI lessons across NATO. 
This will require development of BI-related NATO policy, concept, and 
doctrine. Respecting proper civilian-military relations, NATO has the 
opportunity to do so within the framework of a BI Training Plan approved 
by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). However, the standard military 
decision-making sequence of “policy, concept, doctrine” covering BI issues 
may be delayed while political consensus is achieved among NATO Allies.
BI is moving from the tool kit to operational level. It is important to consider:
1. Legacy of a NATO operation—what remains after a 
NATO Operation? 
2. Awareness of corruption and patronage. 
3. Amount of money and operational needs might create 
corruption opportunities.
4. Time factor in terms of corruption opportunities—the focus 
in different stages of an operation might have a different impact on 
the overall success of the mission.
There is a window of opportunity right now as the “lessons learned” are 
still very recent and very vivid. We should take advantage of this op-
portunity. The lessons learned should be implemented in the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) exercises as well as the Crisis Management 
Exercises (CMX). Within the exercises, it will be important to ad-
dress the matter of corruption risks to depersonalize the term “cor-
ruption”. If the lessons learned are implemented in the major NATO 
exercises, the mainstreaming of these ideas will happen naturally. 
IV. Expected Action Items and Outcomes
With these constraints and framework in mind, NATO must explore 
all possible means to integrate and train BI principles, best prac-
tices, and lessons learned. Possible operational steps forward are:
1. Drafting BI-related changes to the Comprehensive Operations 
Planning Directive issued by NATO Allied Command Operations 
(ACO COPD).
       a. Possible example is ISAF/JFC/SHAPE/ACT MODEL OPLAN 
           ANNEX addressing contracting issues.
2. Drafting a new Bi-Strategic Command Directive (Bi-SCD) on 
BI issues.
       a. Possible example is Bi-SCD 40–1 which addresses gender 
           issues or Bi-SCD 60–70 which addresses procurement issues.
3. Development of new educational curricula in NATO, Partnership for 
Peace (PfP), and national institutions (such as military academies, 
NATO schools, and centres of excellence) in order to guide staff and 
ground commanders.
4. Development of BI guidance for key leaders down to 
lower commanders, making BI enhancement part of the operations.
5. Development of a NATO Standardization Agreement 
(STANAG) which establishes common body of BI knowledge for use 
in education and training. 
       a. Possible example is STANAG 2449, Rule of Law.
6. Drafting of a NATO BI Compendium chapter focused on 
integrating BI principles into military decision-making as well as 
education and training.
7. Creating a community of BI practice through designation of BI 
points of contact in each NATO/PfP ministry.
8. Possible survey or compilation of national common points 
of agreement.  n
Syndicate Sessions
Building Integrity | Conference Proceedings
Page 38 
Participants in the conference, especially syndicate participants, provided 
surprisingly consistent and exceptionally specific and direct messages 
about recommendations and the way forward for Building Integrity (BI). 
Participants first stated that although we have a lot of information in the 
field of BI, the information is not well organized and does not provide 
enough insight on implementation. Researchers and practitioners have 
solidly elaborated theories underpinning BI, but once theory meets practice, 
participants observe a lot of divergence. The recommendations in this area 
were that we need to focus on organizing and standardizing the informa-
tion, and obtaining buy-in from NATO members, partners, and Allies. All 
four syndicate groups and several conference presenters repeatedly stated 
their desire for standards and international agreement to these standards. 
Participants also noted the criticality of timing. They felt that many countries 
and individuals currently have a lot of experiences and lessons learned 
from recent engagements, and lessons learned provide significant insight 
for illustrating tactics that worked and highlighting those strategies that did 
not. Personnel observing these insights must capture lessons learned before 
moving on to other duties. Participants felt that countries currently have the 
momentum and political will to address BI issues, as seen by its prominence 
in NATO communications, the Chicago Summit, and this very conference it-
self. Those of us at this conference must push ahead while the determination 
exists before political leaders and political will are diverted to other crises.
In effect, this conference has been a call to action. Participants felt that the 
academic underpinnings of building integrity have been well established 
by researchers and practitioners alike, and now the BI community needs to 
focus on implementation. In order to achieve this, the BI community needs 
consensus, standardization, and instruction. The community’s main aim is 
to move to a point where we can effectively teach and implement BI ideals. 
With implementation and use of these ideals, everyone will obtain the ben-
efits that can be accrued from creating greater transparency and integrity.  n
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The NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme was launched in 2007 
to promote good practice and support nations to develop effective 
forces that are capable and defence institutions that are accountable 
to the people. Participation is on a voluntary basis, and practical tools 
including education and training activities are available to civilian and 
military personnel. The BI Self Assessment and Peer Review process are 
available to all Allies and partners, and tailored BI programmes have 
been developed to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the nations of South Eastern Europe (SEE). 
The 2013 NATO Building Integrity Conference brought together more than 
170 civil and military representatives drawn from civil and national authori-
ties, international organisations, and the private sector. The conference par-
ticipants discussed the strategic impact of corruption in operations as well as 
the importance of institution building as a keystone to developing good gov-
ernance in the defence and security sector. The plenary and working group 
discussions focused on practical action and concluded with a number of 
recommendations. Among them, it has been agreed that the BI Programme 
should continue to offer practical support to strengthen transparency, 
accountability, and integrity in the defence and security sector and promote 
good practices. The conference identified a number of lessons learned and 
generated a number of ideas and recommendations. Have these exchanges 
resulted in action by NATO and nations? The answer is yes; there have been a 
number of developments in the months since the conference was conducted.   
At NATO HQ, allies consulted with partners and agreed to develop a 
political guidance to complement the existing North Atlantic Council 
agreed Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building and the BI 
Education and Training Plan. This work will be taken forward by the newly 
established BI task force composed of NATO International Staff (IS) and 
NATO Military Representatives. The NATO IS and United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime are also exploring ways to further strengthen cooperation. 
The tailored BI programme for GIRoA will be updated and included as part 
of the post 2014 NATO led operations. This includes follow up to the report 
completed by the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre. 
While these developments at NATO HQ represent a notable step forward  
to embedding BI aspects in NATO policy and procedures, the most signifi-
cant achievements are the actions undertaken by nations since the end of 
February 2013.
Norway has offered the newly established Centre for Integrity in Oslo to 
work with the NATO IS and BI Implementing Partners to support imple-
mentation of the NATO BI Education and Training Plan and the tailored  
BI programme for South Eastern Europe.  
A number of nations have offered subject matter experts to enhance the 
existing BI pool of experts and reinforce the NATO HQ efforts. The UK has 
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offered an expert to map ongoing institution activities, and identify gaps and 
areas to be strengthened. Iceland has offered an expert to support gender 
perspective, and Italy has offered a military expert to support BI efforts. 
A number of nations have also expressed support for the BI tailored pro-
gramme developed in cooperation with the South Eastern Europe Defence 
Ministers. The Bulgarian and Georgian Ministers of Defence took active 
part in the BI workshop conducted in April 2013 in Sofia. The Ukrainian 
Minister of Defence has confirmed support for the BI tailored programme.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to develop BI courses to be conducted  
at the Peace Support Operations Centre for non-commissioned and  
junior officers. 
The conference provided an opportunity for nations to share their experi-
ences regarding the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review Process. A number 
of nations have approached the NATO IS to discuss how to initiate this 
process. As announced at the conference, Georgia has completed the BI 
Self Assessment Survey and requested a Peer Review. Colombia (a first 
time participant in the BI Conference) has confirmed that it will com-
plete the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review. Peer reviews for Hungary, 
Montenegro, and Ukraine will be completed before the end of 2013. 
The conference also discussed updating BI tools. Poland and the 
U.S. have offered to lead an ad hoc group to review lessons learned 
and to offer suggestions for a revised BI Self Assessment Survey. 
Norway, Switzerland, and the U.S. have also offered to develop ad-
ditional resource material to further promote good practice.  
The recommendations developed at the 2013 BI Conference have resulted 
in direct action by NATO and nations. This is an impressive start. Many 
thanks to the U.S. authorities for their generous support in the plan-
ning and conduct of the 2013 BI Conference. Thanks also to the many 
speakers and experts who continue to support the BI Programme. 
Further updates on the BI Programme can be found at the NATO website 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68368.htm.  n
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